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**Success and Shortcomings: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in Eastern
and Central Africa**

Grace Marshall

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Abstract

In post-conflict transitions, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration have played a crucial role in the treatment of former combatants and the advancement of peacebuilding. This peacebuilding process, known as DDR, has experienced successes and failures throughout its implementation across the globe. Specifically, as conflict erupted across many nations in Central and Eastern Africa, the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs that were implemented during different nations' peacebuilding transition towards at the turn of the twenty-first century experienced variations among their success at reducing or halting conflict. This investigation analyzes the factors that contribute to the ability for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs to successfully reduce conflict by examining the implementation of these systems in Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo from 1997 to 2012. The factors analyzed in this study include the time it takes to implement disarmament, the amount of parties that commit to the peace agreement, the robustness of reintegration and vocational training curriculum, and the amount of funding that each program receives. Throughout this comparative analysis, these factors demonstrate to influence the success of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs, however, some of these variables are more influential to the success than others.

Chapter One

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in Eastern and Central Africa

In the wake of the Rwandan Genocide, the Rwandan Patriotic Front began demanding for a national identity to unite the country after tragedy. The Rwandan Patriotic Front took hold of the government, and as a result nearly two million Hutus fled to Zaire, presently referred to as the Democratic Republic of Congo.¹ As the perpetrators of the genocide, members of the Hutu ethnic group spilled over into refugee camps in the Eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo to escape retribution by the Rwandan Patriotic Forces, bringing violence, instability, extreme poverty, and the memory of massacre across the border of the Democratic Republic of Congo.² These Hutu refugees sought asylum in the Democratic Republic of Congo in camps established by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees like Mugunga, where the extremists were naively recognized by the UNHCR as the leaders of the camp and deemed in charge of its governance and food supply.³ Initially, Mugunga harbored Hutu refugees and members of the Interahamwe Militia, but their prolonged presence in the Democratic Republic of Congo brought war with the Rwandan Patriotic Front, resulting in a persisting war that divided support among Central and Eastern African countries between Rwanda and the Congolese.⁴ The Hutus that were guilty of perpetrating the the genocide were eventually killed or fled the Eastern Congo as a result of the war, however, despite these changes Mugunga

¹ Howard Adelman, "The Use and Abuse of Refugees in Zaire: April 1996 to March 1997," *Refugee Manipulation: War, Politics, and the Abuse of Human Suffering* (1999).

² Chris McGreal, "The Roots of the War in the Eastern Congo," *The Guardian*, May 15, 2008.

³ Sudarsan Raghavan, "In Traumatic Arc of a Refugee Camp, Cong's War Runs Deep," *The Washington Post*, November 3, 2013.

⁴ McGreal, "The Roots of the War in the Eastern Congo."

remains. Today, Mugunga houses Congolese refugees who are survivors of violence and unrest in surrounding regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo's Eastern Kivu Province, where over seventy militant groups threaten the stability of the region as they seek to control townships, resources, and political power. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, much like its neighboring countries of Rwanda and Burundi, the conflicts that raged through the 1990s left millions of people displaced and struggling to meet their basic needs well into the twenty-first century.⁵

Those living in Mugunga have yet to see a future without the refugee camp as their home. Within the borders of the encampment, tents are made into restaurants, carpenter and tailoring businesses, and bars. At night, women and children sleep in fear of sexual violence and attacks from members of militias in the surrounding areas.⁶ As fighting in surrounding regions surge, influxes of displaced populations flush into the camps resulting in furthered limited resources like food, water, and goods necessary to meet the basic needs of many Congolese. The Congolese living in Mugunga are not just victim to the violence that was incited by the displaced Hutu rebel groups like the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, but currently continue to face insecurity from other well-armed militant groups like the Mai Mai militia that have committed human rights violations as they fight for power and exploit the nation's expansive network of natural resources in the Kivu regions.⁷

One particular account that highlights the gruesome conditions of reality in the Eastern Kivu Province of the Democratic Republic of Congo is that of Divine's. Interviewed by the

⁵ Martin Edmonds, Greg Mills, and Terence McNamee, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes: The Experience of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo," *African Security* 2:1 (2009).

⁶ Raghavan, "In Traumatic Arc of a Refugee Camp, Cong's War Runs Deep."

⁷ Edmonds, Mills, and McNamee, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes."

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Divine recounts her survival of rape in the woods near Mugunga.

“I was walking through the forest. I was there to collect wood to be sold as charcoal in Mugunga market. That used to be the only way for me to provide a living for my five grandchildren and me. I was already on my way back when, suddenly, three men appeared from nowhere. And they raped me in turn. I suppose I should be happy to be alive. But my life changed completely. What now? I keep thinking of my grandchildren, they need me, I have to get through this for them and for my family.”

- Divine, 72 years old ⁸

To reach food and water, many of the twelve million and eight hundred thousand Congolese in need of assistance must travel unsafe distances, exposing themselves to further threats of sexual violence.⁹ Many people in the area do not see a future of peace, as organizations like the United Nations have failed to stabilize the region despite new promises every year. Failure by the state government and international organizations like the United Nations to hold militant groups socially and functionally accountable and effectively disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate former combatants into the economy has resulted in the devastating reality of human suffering in the region.¹⁰

⁸ “DRC: Women and Girls Bodies are not Battlegrounds,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, accessed December 16, 2019.

⁹ “DRC: Women and Girls Bodies are not Battlegrounds,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

¹⁰ Edmonds, Mills, and McNamee, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes.”

The lives of displaced people in countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo rests in the hands of state governments as they pursue stabilization in combatant warzones and general peace among groups. In an effort to end conflict in Eastern and Central Africa, one of the most common peacebuilding mechanisms implemented across the region is Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration.¹¹ Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs are often dimensions of peace agreements that are designed to assist states in their ability to end conflict within the confines of their borders. State governments, non-profit organizations, and international institutions like the United Nations have programs set up across the world to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate combatants into society to prevent future violence and deter militants from rejoining insurgency groups through economic opportunity and political integration.¹² Known as DDR, these programs bring promises of security and early prosperity to former militants in states where conflict has recently subsided and peacebuilding is in its early phases. This procedure or policy is defined by the United Nations as “the process that targets a determinant number of combatants, whether as individuals or groups, belonging to the Armed Forces of armed opposition groups, in order to disarm, demilitarize and reintegrate these persons into civilian life, the Armed Forces, or the police”.¹³ DDR programs assist in a country’s transition towards peace and their success increases the government’s likelihood to keep peace between parties and develop after warfare. These programs work to ensure that combatants are

¹¹ Stephanie Hanson, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in Africa,” *Council on Foreign Relations*, accessed on December 1st, 2019.

¹² The United Nations Peacekeeping Associated Press, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,” *The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping*, accessed on December 6, 2019.

¹³ Angel Rabasa et al, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration," *From Insurgency to Stability: Volume I: Key Capabilities and Practices*, (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation 2011), 52.

fully reintegrating into civilian life, allowing for communities within warzones to build back peace, security, and work to forward their stalled economic development.¹⁴

Although the United Nations has provided the international community with a widely accepted definition for DDR, each step in the program serves a unique purpose that propels communities toward peace. Each of these programs begins with disarmament, which Angel Rabasa with the National Defense Research Institute defines as the “collection, documentation, control, and elimination of combatant small arms and light weapons, ammunition, and explosives.”¹⁵ Within DDR programs, disarmament focuses specifically on individual small arm weaponry, and often includes provisions to turn in weapons to the national government or sell them to other countries across the globe. The flow of these weapons undermines security and stability within these specific states struggling with conflict, and their presence has proved to serve as a factor in forced displacements, human rights violations, and casualties in conflict.¹⁶ The next step towards peacebuilding from disarmament is often demobilization, where combatants are formally discharged from their armed forces or their armed militant groups.¹⁷ Here, former militants are taken out of society and given humanitarian assistance based on the needs of the region at the time.¹⁸ Within this phase of the process, militants are often taught the provisions of peace agreements and familiarize themselves with their rights within the state

¹⁴ Rabasa, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” *From Insurgency to Stability*, 52.

¹⁵ Rabasa, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” *From Insurgency to Stability*, 53.

¹⁶ The United Nations Office of Disarmament Associate Press, “Small Arms,” *The United Nations Office of Disarmament*, accessed December 1st, 2019.

¹⁷ The United Nations, *Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards*, accessed December 6, 2019.

¹⁸ The United Nations, *Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards*.

before being released into civil society.¹⁹ According to Rabasa, the inclusion of all armed parties in the peace discussions is vital to the success of DDR, as group exclusion only “addresses the needs and concerns of only [the participating] entities.”²⁰ Demobilization should include all members of the specific militant groups that have agreed to the peace accords. The final step in DDR programs, features the transition of militants from participants in conflict to their status as members of civil society and the economy.²¹ Reintegration is the process by which combatants receive vocational training and education that provide them the skills necessary to formally integrate into the economy and earn an income outside of violence.²²

Although these programs serve as peacebuilding mechanisms in post-conflict states, they do not always prove to be effective in their ability to reduce the presence of conflict. Sometimes programs do not always result in the reintegration of former combatants into civil society, as some militants default back into resurgence.²³ DDR programs across the globe have seen abundant successes or infamous failures, all depending on a variety of factors and the nature of the conflicts in the region. In Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, DDR programs that were implemented in 2005 were unsuccessful in their ability to reintegrate former combatants, despite their ability to disarm over one hundred thousand individuals.²⁴ In these three specific countries, the Council on Foreign Relations attributes this failure to the DDR program’s lack of funding and weaknesses in the comprehensive vocational

¹⁹ Rabasa, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” 54.

²⁰ Rabasa, “Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration,” 55.

²¹ Hanson, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in Africa,” *Council on Foreign Relations*.

²² Rabasa, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” 54.

²³ Macartan Humphreys, “Demobilization and Reintegration,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51:4 (2007): 532.

²⁴ Hanson, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in Africa,” *Council on Foreign Relations*.

training to secure employment.²⁵ Thus, the presence of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in states attempting to reconcile or reconstruct due to conflict does not guarantee stabilization.²⁶ Instead, each factor that influences the implementation of DDR programs contributes to the success or failure of the program as a whole. For the purpose of this project, I will examine which aspects of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration are the most important to the program's ability to reduce conflict within states in Central and Eastern Africa. By examining the factors that influence the ability for these programs to be successful at reducing conflict in Eastern and Central Africa, international organizations and the state's sanctioning these programs can improve the design and implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, in an effort to stabilize these regions through their peacebuilding transitions and end the expansive system of human suffering that is the result of these extended periods of violence.

A. Literature Review

Various scholars in the fields of political science, international relations, and conflict management offer different solutions as to what specific aspects of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs contribute to the system's ability to halt the presence of active conflict. Various hypotheses provide a basic understanding of the factors that contribute to the success of these programs, however, the knowledge regarding the long-term impact of

²⁵ Hanson, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in Africa," *Council on Foreign Relations*.

²⁶ Michael Gilligan, "Reintegration Ex-Rebels into Civilian Life: Evidence from a Quasi experiment in Burundi," (New York, New York: New York University Press, 2010).

disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs is often limited based on the ways in which scholars evaluate each dimension.²⁷

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration campaigns are often implemented with unforeseen consequences, despite their beneficial nature. Recent literature suggests that DDR programs are not always consistent, as the program's failure often contributes to a resurgence of conflict or an increase in illicit activity.²⁸ According to Angel Rabasa, author of "From Insurgency to Stability," disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration failed in Liberia in 2003 as the program decided to "commence weapon decommission despite the lack of accurate data and preparation resulted in a violent reaction by the ex-combatants."²⁹ After 2003, the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program in Liberia resulted in the death of nine United Nations peacekeepers and the collection of less than fifty percent of weapons.³⁰ Along with this, according to Rabasa, the strict oversight of these programs is crucial to their success as different disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs can incite increased violence if the flow of confiscated weapons is not adequately regulated.³¹ Monitoring also includes the dimension of demobilization, as demobilization camps have the opportunity to be used as recruitment grounds for militant groups if they are kept destitute.³² Rabasa also argues that reintegration programs must be comprehensive and they become effective when those

²⁷ Gilligan, "Reintegration of Ex-Rebels into Civilian Life."

²⁸ Rabasa, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration," 78.

²⁹ Rabasa, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration," 72.

³⁰ Rabasa, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration," 72.

³¹ Rabasa, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration," 75.

³² Rabasa, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration," 74.

implementing each program take holistic approaches to their design.³³ This means that all active parties to the conflict must be included in the DDR program as they are included in the peace agreements.³⁴ Rabasa's research points to the example of the Philippines, where the state was once struggling with but has now become a popular tourist destination in Southeast Asia as a result of a comprehensive DDR program that included provincial governments, the national government, the military, the police, local businesses, and community representatives.³⁵

Although a comprehensive program is effective, Rabasa states that perhaps the biggest factor contributing to the effectiveness of DDR in post-conflict states is their ability to raise and maintain sufficient funding for their programs.³⁶ If programs are not funded correctly, they subject the region to a resurgence of violence as ex-militants might not see the benefits of reintegration or might feel unsupported by the DDR program that has been implemented.³⁷ Without sufficient funding, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs have proven to be ineffective. In Angel Rabasa's study, evidence for the argument for sufficient funding is supported with the examples from the DDR program that began in Columbia in 2005. In Columbia, over thirty thousand militants joined the Peace and Justice Law of 2005 that transitions them into demobilization camps.³⁸ The Colombian government, however, only anticipated twelve thousand militants to be disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated into civil society so the program quickly became overwhelmed and its resources became overstretched. As

³³ Rabasa, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration," 56.

³⁴ Rabasa, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration," 56.

³⁵ Rabasa, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration," 56.

³⁶ Rabasa, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration," 57.

³⁷ Rabasa, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration," 57.

³⁸ Rabasa, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration," 57.

a result, Rabasa reported that over seventy five percent of the individuals who entered the program did not receive employment, pushing many ex-combatants into militancy as they rejoined preexisting criminal gangs.³⁹ Patrick Truffer, a graduate of Free University of Berlin's International Relations Master's Program and member of the Swiss Armed Forces, also argues that lack of funding is detrimental to DDR programs – citing that inadequate monetary support for the DDR program alongside “inadequate structural prerequisites” made reintegration in the Central African Republic “almost impossible.”⁴⁰

Unlike Angel Rabasa's or Patrick Truffer's beliefs in the importance of funding and a holistic approach to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs, Michael J. Gilligan argued that the success of DDR programs is dependent on a strong reintegration component, as he believes that this is the most important step in the peacebuilding process as a whole.⁴¹ Michael J. Gilligan, an expert in post-conflict reconstruction and a professor at New York University, further explained that reintegration is believed to be “a critical part of the peace process because it links the more immediate requirements of disarmament and demobilization to the long-term imperatives of social and economic welfare.”⁴² Gilligan finds that the strength of the reintegration component is the most important factor in the creation of an effective DDR program because during conflict, combatants often do not have economic capital and often turn towards joining militant groups or conducting unlawful activity to survive.⁴³ As a result, if the

³⁹ Rabasa, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” 57.

⁴⁰ Patrick Truffer, “Successful Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” *Offiziere*, accessed on December 1st, 2019..

⁴¹ Gilligan, “Reintegration of Ex-Rebels into Civilian Life,” 601.

⁴² Gilligan, “Reintegration of Ex-Rebels into Civilian Life,” 601.

⁴³ Gilligan, “Reintegration of Ex-Rebels into Civilian Life,” 602.

reintegration program is not strong enough ex-militants can easily default into conflict once again and seek economic refuge from rebel groups, thus contributing to the weakening of peace agreements and the resurgence in violence.⁴⁴ Gilligan uses Burundi's disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program as a case study for the effect that a strong reintegration component has on the effectiveness of DDR as a whole. In his research, Michael J. Gilligan found that "reintegration programs produced a significant boost to income among ex-combatants who would otherwise have been among the worst off, resulting in substantial lowering of poverty incidences."⁴⁵

Michael Gilligan's assertions on the importance of reintegration are further supported by Mark Knight, the Executive in Residence Fellow at Geneva Centre for Security Studies. Knight argues that former combatants pose a significant threat to the process of peacebuilding in post-conflict states if they are not placed into employment opportunities.⁴⁶ A combatant's lack of income can further increase their willingness to commit crimes and break peace accords, making lasting peace difficult to obtain despite the absence of conflict.⁴⁷ Knight's research uses Paul Collier's macro-insecurity framework to further support his hypothesis, explaining that if the "grievances and frustrations of demobilized combatants are not addressed through reintegration strategies, former combatants can be remobilized easily and pose a security risk to the region."⁴⁸ Despite the emphasis on the importance of reintegration, Knight's hypothesis also supports that

⁴⁴ Gilligan, "Reintegration of Ex-Rebels into Civilian Life," 602.

⁴⁵ Gilligan, "Reintegration of Ex-Rebels into Civilian Life," 617.

⁴⁶ Mark Knight, "Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace," *Journal of Peace Research* 41:4 (2004): 502.

⁴⁷ Knight, "Guns, Camps and Cash," 502.

⁴⁸ Knight, "Guns, Camps and Cash," 502.

of Angel Rabasa, as he suggests that the coordination of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs through a holistic approach ensures the creation of an effective relationship between the program and the peacebuilding process itself.⁴⁹ Knight's agreeance with both Gilligan and Rabasa is met, however, with his suggestion that the most influential factor in the creation of an effective DDR program is the timely implementation of the process itself.⁵⁰ Knight's final argument, and the conclusion to his research, indicates that a swift and timely approach to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration influences the state's ability to pursue and implement positive peace and development after conflict.⁵¹

In No Magic Bullet: A Critical Perspective on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Weapons Reduction in Post-Conflict Contexts, Robert Muggah argues that DDR programs are an "intrinsic component of the post-conflict period."⁵² Robert Muggah, a Canadian Political Scientist and the Research Director of Igarape Institute, explains that DDR programs are often disproportionately focused on disarmament and demobilization, rather than reintegration.⁵³ Along with this, the expectations of each program are important to their success as ex-combatants might understand that they are receiving benefits different than those that are actually on the table.⁵⁴ In Liberia, for example, due to the program's undereducation about the

⁴⁹ Knight, "Guns, Camps and Cash," 502.

⁵⁰ Knight, "Guns, Camps and Cash," 513.

⁵¹ Knight, "Guns, Camps and Cash," 513.

⁵² Robert Muggah, "No Magic Bullet: A Critical Perspective on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Weapons Reduction in Post-conflict Contexts," *The Commonwealth Journals of International Affairs* 94: 374 (2005).

⁵³ Muggah, "No Magic Bullet," *The Commonwealth Journals of International Affairs*.

⁵⁴ Muggah, "No Magic Bullet," *The Commonwealth Journals of International Affairs*.

conflict and area, soldiers rioted in the streets when they were denied certain benefits that were not provided to them.⁵⁵

Lilli Banholzer, a professor at the University of Mannheim in Political Science and Conflict Studies, has also contributed hypotheses as to what factors influence the success of DDR programs in their ability to deter conflict.⁵⁶ In Banholzer's research, she indicates that much of the scholarship regarding the effectiveness of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration is focused on one of two categories: the structural components of a state, or the technical components of the program as a whole.⁵⁷ Banholzer explains that there is a correlation between the economic and political conditions of a nation and their ability to effectively disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate ex-combatants into society.⁵⁸ Depending on the nation's regime type and the health of their economy at the time of peacebuilding, former combatants may be more or less successful at reintegrating into society.⁵⁹ However, Banholzer highlights the misconception surrounding the reintegration dimension of each program, pointing out that DDR does not change the economic development of the state as a whole, but is meant to influence individual development within the state's economy.⁶⁰ Like Mark Knight, Banholzer argues that the timing of the implementation of DDR programs is vital to the program's ability to achieve its goal. Banholzer argues that as DDR is postponed, the effectiveness of the program begins to

⁵⁵ Muggah, "No Magic Bullet," *The Commonwealth Journals of International Affairs*.

⁵⁶ "Professor Dr. Lilli Banholzer," The University of Mannheim, accessed on March 31, 2019.

⁵⁷ Lilli Banholzer, "When Do Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programs Succeed?" *German Development Institute* (Bonn, Germany: German Development Institute, 2014) 17.

⁵⁸ Banholzer, "When Do Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," 18.

⁵⁹ Banholzer, "When do Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration," 18 – 19.

⁶⁰ Banholzer, "When Do Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," 18.

decrease.⁶¹ However, Banholzer's argument diverges from that of Knight's as her research indicates that immediate implementation is not a precondition for the program's success, but rather the postponement of the program's implementation for too long is a precondition for the ineffectiveness.⁶²

Despite the contribution to the argument of timeliness of implementation, Lilli Banholzer primarily focuses her research on the macro-factors that contribute to the effectiveness of DDR, like state capacity and regime type, which are not the focus of this comparative analysis. Many of the macro-factors that experts like Banholzer engage with in their research into the successes and failures of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration are difficult to control for, as each conflict has unique characteristics regarding the state's capacity, economic development level, regime type, geographical size, and cultural heterogeneity that influence the politics and public opinion within the nation. Due to these macro-factors, DDR programs face different challenges within every nation and thus should be analyzed with these regional, political, and economic differences in mind.

For the purpose of this comparative analysis, I am interested in studying the micro-factors that influence the successes and failures of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs in Eastern and Central African countries. The results of this investigation can be later used to influence the development of these programs in the region as well as alter the different policies implemented by states who sanction disarmament, demobilization, and

⁶¹ Banholzer, "When Do Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," 23.

⁶² Banholzer, "When Do Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," 23.

reintegration programs to ensure an increased chance at their success in reducing conflict in the region or halting it altogether.

B. Hypotheses

Through an analysis of the literature that was previously reviewed in this chapter, I predict that the most important factor that contributes to the success of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs ability to reduce conflict is a comprehensive strategy of implementation that prioritizes all three aspects of the system holistically and equally, rather than favoring one dimension over the others. In the pursuit to reduce or deter conflict, DDR programs must have strong disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration dimensions so that former combatants do not remilitarize. Although my hypothesis suggests that a holistic and comprehensive DDR program is vital to its ability to halt conflict, within each dimension different factors influence the system's strength. As subsequent hypotheses, I predict the following...

1. Disarmament programs are more likely to be successful in their contribution to deterring conflict if they are implemented within a year after the peace agreement. Disarmament programs are also more likely to be successful if more than a majority of arms in the nation are collected and the majority of combatants are disarmed.
2. Demobilization programs are more likely to be successful in their contribution to deterring conflict if all parties privy to the conflict are bound to the peace accords and uphold their responsibilities throughout the mandate.

3. Reintegration programs are more likely to be successful to their contributions to deterring conflict if the vocational training is of high quality. Along with this, reintegration programs are more likely to be successful if a majority of disarmed and demobilized combatants are enrolled and graduate from this vocational training.
4. The overall success of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs is likely if each dimension is adequately funded.

For the purpose of this comparative analysis, I will analyze the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs in Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic between 1997 and 2012 to determine the factors that influence DDR programs' ability to reduce or halt conflict in peacebuilding states. I hypothesize that an ideal DDR program would include strength in all three dimensions, as well as adequate coordination and funding for the project.

C. Variables

As the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs in Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo are examined throughout this comparative analysis, their success will be measured based on the presence of conflict in the region at the time that the program ends. Alongside this initial measurement, I will also examine the factors that contribute to the ability for DDR systems to reduce conflict in each country. Once this assessment is achieved, I will examine each dimension of the program individually. For the purpose of this study, each dimension will be measured by the following...

1. Disarmament will be measured by the number of combatants that are disarmed, relative to the overall size of the population. Within the category of disarmament, I

- will examine how the time it takes to implement this specific dimension of the program contributes to the overall number of people who are disarmed.
2. Demobilization will be measured based on the number of armed parties that are demobilized in demobilization camps.
 3. Reintegration programs will be examined based on the quality of their vocational education alongside and the number of former militants who attend and graduate from the program proportional to the number of individuals who are considered disarmed combatants. Although reintegration is often measured by the amount of former combatants who gain employment after going through the program, I have chosen to examine the number of individuals who receive quality vocational training because the number of individuals who receive employment can vary depending on the state of economic development throughout the country as a whole.

Through these measurements, I will be able to draw correlations between the factors that are most important to the success of DRR programs to prevent conflict during the peacebuilding process.

D. Case Studies

Since 1992, the majority of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs have been executed on the African continent.⁶³ Due to the continent's history with conflict, there is a higher concentration of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs as countries move towards forging agreements with warring parties and transition into the stages of peacebuilding. This comparative analysis will specifically analyze the methods that sponsors

⁶³ Hanson, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in Africa," *Council on Foreign Relations*.

employ to execute DDR programs in three countries that were selected due to their differing success levels in their ability to reduce conflict. In an attempt to identify which aspects of DDR programs are most important to the system's success at reducing the presence of conflict in Eastern and Central Africa, I will examine the implementation of DDR in Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Each of these programs were implemented within the fifteen-year period between 1997 and 2012, share a similar geographical location, and have overlap regarding the context of their conflicts. Many of the macro-factors that experts like Lilli Banholzer are concerned with are controlled for through the selection of these case studies, as all three of these nations have relatively low economic development, have a sense of cultural homogeneity, and have young and developing governments at the time of the implementation of state sanctioned disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. This study will examine each of the three countries' disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs in the chronological order of its implementation: Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Each of the three case studies that will be examined throughout this comparative analysis implemented DDR programs between 1997 and 2012 that varied on their success to halt the presence of conflict within the confines of their borders.

In Rwanda, the first disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration campaign began in 1997 and lasted until 2001.⁶⁴ After the Rwandan Genocide that lasted one hundred days in 1994 and resulted in the deaths of over eight hundred thousand people, civilian control over the military was instituted and the state began to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate former militants from the Rwandan Defense Force, the Forces Armees Rwandais (also known as the FAR), and

⁶⁴ Lars Waldorf, "Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Rwanda," *International Center for Transitional Justice*, (London, United Kingdom: International Center for Transitional Justice, 2009).

other smaller militant genocidaires groups.⁶⁵ Rwanda's DDR program is regarded as a success due to the system's quality in its construction and the number of former militants that were reintegrated into the country's economy.⁶⁶ Alongside Rwanda, Burundi is also regarded among conflict and peacebuilding specialists as a success.⁶⁷ Under the Arusha Agreement of 2000, Burundi was required to implement a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program that was overseen by their transitional government and executed in 2004.⁶⁸ From 2004 to 2008, the state government of Burundi oversaw a DDR system that was outlined within the conflict's peace agreement and included a time line and comprehensive technical plans.⁶⁹ In an attempt to understand the factors that contribute to the ability for DDR systems to reduce the presence of conflict, the programs implemented in Rwanda and Burundi will be analyzed in this study to gain a better understanding as to why they were successful at decreasing the presence and likelihood of conflict.

Contrastingly, the Democratic Republic of Congo experienced differences in their implementation of DDR programs that contributed to their failure to deter the presence of conflict. The Democratic Republic of Congo faced many challenges in its implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program between 2004 and 2011. Despite the

⁶⁵ Martin Edmonds, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes: The Experience of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo," *African Security* 2:1 (2009).

⁶⁶ Edmonds, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration," *African Security*.

⁶⁷ Rens Willems, Jesper Kleingeld, Mathijs van Leeuwen, "Connecting Community Security and DDR: Experiences from Burundi," *Peace and Security Network*, accessed December 3, 2019, 10.

⁶⁸ Willems, Kleingeld, van Leeuwen, "Connecting Community Security and DDR," *Peace and Security Network*, 10.

⁶⁹ Prosper Nzekani Zena, "The Lessons and Limits of DDR in Africa," *Africa Center for Strategic Studies* 24 (2013).

state government's attempt to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate former militants into civil society, the Democratic Republic of Congo experienced a resurgence of violence as the program was unable to prevent individuals from rejoining militant groups.⁷⁰ The failures of the DDR programs in the Democratic Republic of Congo will be examined comparatively to that of Rwanda and Burundi to further understand what factors contribute to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program's ability to reduce or prevent conflict.

E. Future of the Comparative Analysis

As African nations moved toward independence from their colonial oppressors in the 1960s, freedom and peace was not immediately gratified for much of the continent.⁷¹ As independent governments were formed, the legacy of colonialism lingered throughout the region, influencing the creation of chaos, civil war, and violence throughout many of the continent's individual countries.⁷² Many people are still suffering from conflicts, like those still living in destitution and fear in places like Mugunga, as states have failed in their implementation of peacebuilding mechanisms like disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. However, as the conflicts in the Central and Eastern regions of the continent subsided, many of these peacebuilding mechanisms work to prevent the resurgence of violence, stabilize the region, and further social and economic development.

For the purpose of this comparative analysis, as aforementioned, I will examine disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration as one specific mechanism within peacebuilding

⁷⁰ Joanne Richards, "DDR in DRC: The Impact of Command and Control," *Geneva Institute of International Development Studies*, accessed on December 5, 2019, 1.

⁷¹ George Ayittey, *Africa in Chaos*, (New York, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 7.

⁷² Ayittey, *Africa in Chaos*, 8.

initiatives. As such, for the remainder of this investigation, I will analyze the factors that contribute to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs ability to successfully halting violence in Central and Eastern Africa. This comparative analysis was intended to contribute to the literature already published regarding that factors that contribute to the success of DDR, arguing that it is a comprehensive and holistic approach that is vital to DDR's ability to reduce conflict. The investigation will conclude with a discussion of the importance of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs and the effectiveness at reducing or ending the presence of conflict in Eastern and Central Africa. In the upcoming chapters, I will examine the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs in Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo during the years between 1997 and 2012 to gain a further understanding of the factors that contribute to the ability for DDR to successfully reduce conflict and act as a mechanism towards peacebuilding.

Chapter Two

Rwanda: Light in the Midst of Darkness

On July 4th, 1994, the Rwanda Patriotic Force (RPF) moved into Kigali against the state military and Hutu militias, marking the beginning of the end of the Rwandan Genocide and Civil War.⁷³ As the Tutsi-dominated military force advanced through the capital, a mass exodus of Hutus and former genocidaires fled to refugee camps in Zaire, where their presence would instigate heinous instability and violence for the Congolese in the years to come.⁷⁴ When the violence finally stopped, over eight hundred thousand people were declared dead or missing and an estimated seventy-seven thousand percent of the Tutsi population had been exterminated.⁷⁵ Rwanda infrastructure laid in ruin, as hospitals, schools, and government buildings had been destroyed or ransacked and harvests had been destroyed. Many members of the population became victims of mass rapes and sex slavery; the carnage resulted in the creation of unmarked mass graves, or, in some cases, left decomposing bodies out in the open, yet to be laid to rest.⁷⁶ Generations of Rwandans were completely destroyed and many families were annihilated – their lineage ending because of violence created by their neighbors, friends, and those whom they thought could be trusted.⁷⁷ As the country faced this mass devastation, the strength and

⁷³ Martin Meredith, *The Fate of Africa: A History of the Continent Since Independence* (New York, New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 522.

⁷⁴ Meredith, *The Fate of Africa*, 521.

⁷⁵ Marijke Verpoorten, “The Death Toll of the Rwanda Genocide: A Detailed Analysis for the Gikongoro Province,” *Population* 60:4 (2005).

⁷⁶ Kenneth White, “Scourge of Racism: Genocide in Rwanda,” *Journal of Black Studies* 39:3 (2009): 477.

⁷⁷ Meredith, *The Fate of Africa*, 523.

effectiveness of peacebuilding programs in Rwanda became imperative in the deterrence of resurging conflict and economic, social, and political development in the failed state.

The peacebuilding process in Rwanda began prior to the genocide. In 1993, the United Nations sponsored the brokering of the *Peace Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front*, which came to be known as the Arusha Accords. The Rwandan military, known as the Rwanda Defense Force (RDF), and government were largely controlled by members of the Hutu population, while the Rwandan Patriotic Front, led by Paul Kagame, was a predominantly Tutsi rebel group prior to the massacres in 1994.⁷⁸ The negotiations mediated by the United Nations in Arusha, Tanzania, resulted in an agreement that would end the Rwandan Civil War and establish a government in which both parties were required to equally share power.⁷⁹ With representation from Burundi, Uganda, Zaire, Tanzania, the African Union, the United Nations, Germany, Belgium, the United States, France, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe, the two parties agreed to implement the Arusha Agreement in thirty seven days and elect a transitional government to lead the state as conflict-reconstruction and institution building began.⁸⁰ Although the agreement was signed in August of 1993, the two participating parties demonstrated very little interest in enforcing the agreement. Both the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front continued to train their members in armed combat, violating the agreement's provision requiring the national military to decrease in overall

⁷⁸ "Rwanda: The Failure of the Arusha Peace Accords," The National Security Archives, accessed April 14, 2020. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB469/>.

⁷⁹ "Peace Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front," *The Arusha Accords*, 1993. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/RW_930804_PeaceAgreementRwanda-RwandesePatrioticFront.pdf.

⁸⁰ "Peace Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front," *The Arusha Accords*.

size and the full demobilization of the RPF.⁸¹ Although the United Nations was to supervise the peacebuilding process in Rwanda, tensions between the two parties continued and messages about an ethnic cleansing of the Tutsi community spread throughout Hutu militias.⁸² Despite the initial attempt for peace, the assassination of President Juvenal Habyarimana on April 6th, 1994 triggered the beginning of the Rwandan Genocide.⁸³ The failure for the 1993 Arusha Accords to deter the explosion of violence in Rwanda in 1994 served to caution the international community and the newly established Rwandan government from the perils of weak peacebuilding provisions and feeble enforcement. With the assistance of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), the Republic of Rwanda established a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration operation for former soldiers of the Rwanda Defense Force (also known as the Rwandan Armed Forces prior to 1994 (FAR)) and the armed genocidaires who still resided in Rwanda.⁸⁴ This post-conflict development program focused on national reconciliation and modernization with an emphasis on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration provisions.⁸⁵

The post-genocide disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration operations began in Rwanda with the establishment of two programs, with different provisions and oversight. The first program, established and supported by Rwandan Presidential Decree Number 37/01 under

⁸¹ Phil Clark, "Bringing Them All Back Home: The Challenges of DDR and Transitional Justice in Contexts of Displacement in Rwanda and Uganda," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 27:2 (2014): 241.

⁸² "Rwanda: The Failure of the Arusha Peace Accords," The National Security Archives.

⁸³ "Rwanda: The Failure of the Arusha Peace Accords," The National Security Archives.

⁸⁴ Martin Edmonds, Greg Mills, and Terance McNamee, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes: The Experience of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo," *African Security* 2:1 (2009).

⁸⁵ "New Beginnings for Ex-Combatants in Rwanda," The World Bank, accessed February 12, 2020, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2019/01/28/new-beginnings-for-ex-combatants-in-rwanda>.

President Pasteur Bizimungu, established the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission.⁸⁶ This institution was mandated to support the reinsertion and reintegration of former combatants and military soldiers into the civil sector and formal economy with the intention that their transition would deter resurgence, instability, and spark comprehensive economic development in the wake of tragedy.⁸⁷ Overseen by the Rwandan government and President Bizimungu's cabinet, the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission was established in 1997 and included six main responsibilities according to the Republic of Rwanda's Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission Program (RDRC) Charter:

1. To oversee the social reinsertion and reintegration of members of the Rwandan Defense Forces.
2. To receive, demobilize, and carry out social reinsertion and reintegration for former members of the national army before July 19, 1994, or a former member of any other armed group that was repatriated.
3. To advocate for the initiatives meant for former military members with disability and follow up the implementation of such initiatives.
4. To advise the government on the policy of demobilization, social reinsertion and reintegration of former military members.
5. To coordinate the actions of all Government organs and all stakeholders working with the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission on matters related to demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration of former military members.
6. To carry out such other activities as may be required for the achievement of its mission.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ "The RDRC Background," The Republic of Rwanda: Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission/Program, accessed February 12, 2020. <http://demobrwanda.gov.rw/index.php?id=76>.

⁸⁷ "The RDRC Background," The Republic of Rwanda.

⁸⁸ "The RDRC Background," The Republic of Rwanda.

The Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission focused specifically on demobilizing and reintegrating former militants, rather than disarming them altogether. Disarmament was voluntary for individuals interested in participating in the program, the Rwandan government lacked resources to establish a robust arms collection program. Along with this, by 1997 the United Nations and the World Bank invested their monetary and technical support for the disarmament of former genocidaires and members of the Interahamwe in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where Hutus established refugee communities after their exodus from Rwanda in July of 1994.⁸⁹

Without the intention to forcefully disarm individuals participating in operations run by the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, the Rwandan government aimed to demobilize and reintegrate five major insurgency groups into civil society: “the Rwandan Patriotic Front; the Hutu-led government’s Armed Forces of Rwanda; the Rwanda Patriotic Army, later renamed the Rwandan Defense Forces; the abacagenzi, a Hutu insurgency in northwest Rwanda; and the armed groups of Rwandan Hutu rebels that fled to the Democratic Republic of Congo from the Interahamwe.”⁹⁰ The first of these groups to participate in demobilization and reintegration was the Rwandan Patriot Front and the Rwandan Defense Force. From the program’s implementation in September of 1997 to March of 2001, Rwanda reinserted RPA soldiers into the RDF, to nearly balance the national military of Rwanda between the two organization and create relatively equal populations of Hutus and Tutsis within the state’s armed forces as the original 1993 Arusha Accords required.⁹¹ Thus, from 1997 to 2001,

⁸⁹ Nelson Alusala, “Disarmament and Reconciliation: Rwanda’s Concern,” *Institute for Security Studies* 108 (2005).

⁹⁰ Lars Waldorf, “Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Rwanda,” *The International Center for Transitional Justice* (2009): 8.

⁹¹ Waldorf, “Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Rwanda,” 5.

the Rwandan government created a equal balance of Hutus to Tutsis in officer positions of the RDF, and created a sixty-forty ethnic balance within other ranks proportional to the population.⁹² However, the success of this reinsertion program is reported by the government of Rwanda, as the ethnic identity of soldiers was not revealed to the rest of the military to dissuade tension between the two groups. As a result, these proportions could potentially be inaccurately reported. After reinsertion, the remaining sixty-eight percent of the Rwandan Patriotic Front participated in formal demobilization, which required medical counseling, social sensitization, and the allowance of a transitional safety net equaling the amount of nine hundred United States dollars.⁹³ From 1997 to 2001, members of the RPF were held in demobilization centers for two weeks and then received vocational training prior to their release into civil society.⁹⁴

After the demobilization and reintegration of members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, members of the Rwandan Defense Force and ex-FAR soldiers began participating in the state-operated demobilization and reintegration program from December of 2001 to May of 2007.⁹⁵ During demobilization, those who had once been included in insurgencies across Rwanda were transitioned through mobilization camps that provided individuals with medical attention, shelter, nutrition, civic education, as well as basic vocational skills.⁹⁶ Along with this, demobilization training camps included reeducation programs that attempted to fight genocidal ideology called *ingando*. Nationalistic in nature, these programs taught former combatants and

⁹² Waldorf, "Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Rwanda," 9.

⁹³ Waldorf, "Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Rwanda," 9.

⁹⁴ Waldorf, "Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Rwanda," 10.

⁹⁵ Waldorf, "Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Rwanda," 10.

⁹⁶ "New Beginnings for Ex-Combatants in Rwanda," The World Bank.

participants in the RDF and ex-FAR about Rwandan history, national identity, judicial reconciliation, and the gacaca process.⁹⁷ Former militants also received information on micro-financing, public health measures, and received information on active cooperatives in different industries for those reintegrating into the national economy.⁹⁸ Going further than the needs of the former combatants, the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission provided condensed demobilization programs for the families of participating combatants to ease their transition into civil society.

The reintegration process, similar to the demobilization process of the RDRC, included many different forms of vocational training activities and encouraged participants to join public works programs that sought to rebuild the nation in the wake of tragedy.⁹⁹ Reintegration included monetary benefits for militants who agreed to transition into civilian life. After demobilization, former militants received service allowances, reintegration grants, and vulnerability support grants as long as they maintained a peaceful demeanor and contributed to the long-term restoration and development of communities across the state.¹⁰⁰ Under the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, former combatants were provided access micro-loans and education programs in industries like agriculture, construction, taxi driving, and tailoring.¹⁰¹ The reintegration process that took place under the control of the Rwandan

⁹⁷ Waldorf, "Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Rwanda," 11.

⁹⁸ "New Beginnings for Ex-Combatants in Rwanda," The World Bank.

⁹⁹ Martin Edmonds, Greg Mills, and Terance McNamee, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes: The Experience of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo," *African Security* 2:1 (2009).

¹⁰⁰ Edmonds, Mills, and McNamee, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes."

¹⁰¹ "New Beginnings for Ex-Combatants in Rwanda," The World Bank.

government coexisted alongside a judicial reconciliation program, in which former combatant were potentially subjected to criminal investigations into their actions during the genocide.¹⁰² Transitional justice occurred alongside the reintegration process, furthering the sense of security among Rwandans that the period of conflict and strife throughout the nation was over.

Although the state controlled the demobilization and reintegration process in Rwanda through the establishment of the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, from 2002 to 2008 the institution received added support and funding from the World Bank through the International Development Association's Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Program.¹⁰³ Other members of the international community, specifically the United States Aid for International Development and the United Nations Development Program, provided assistance to the state-operated demobilization and reintegration program.¹⁰⁴ Despite the international community's involvement, the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission implemented and oversaw the execution of the entire program, demonstrating a state led approach for individuals residing in Rwanda after the genocide. Despite the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program's initial goal of reintegrating 45,000 former militants, by the end of the operation in 2007, the Rwandan government effectively demobilized and reintegrated 57,538 former militants.¹⁰⁵ Of these individuals, thirty-two percent were reinserted into the military from the Rwandan Patriotic Front.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰² "New Beginnings for Ex-Combatants in Rwanda," The World Bank.

¹⁰³ "Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Project," The World Bank, accessed April 14, 2020. <https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P075129?lang=en>.

¹⁰⁴ Alusala, "Disarmament and Reconciliation: Rwanda's Concern."

¹⁰⁵ Alusala, "Disarmament and Reconciliation: Rwanda's Concern."

¹⁰⁶ Alusala, "Disarmament and Reconciliation: Rwanda's Concern."

Although the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission was considered successful in its ability to curb violence within the state through its treatment of former militants, the largest threat to stability for the nation resided right across its borders in the Kivu Provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The former genocidaires, members of Hutu militant groups, and the Interahamwe fled into the Democratic Republic of Congo after the end of the civil war, placing the responsibility on the United Nations to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate the various populations back into Rwandan society.¹⁰⁷ In 2000, the United Nations established the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), which gained the responsibility of DDR operations of the Rwandan Hutus living in the Democratic Republic of Congo after the outbreak of the Second Congo War, which included conflicts among the Congolese and the former-Rwandan Hutus in the Kivu Provinces.¹⁰⁸ The Republic of Rwanda's interest in the prosecution and disarmament of former Hutu genocidaires and the Interahamwe, along with the Rwandan Defense Force's military involvement in the Second Congolese War, resulted in criticism from multilateral organizations like the United Nations.¹⁰⁹ Due to their involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Rwandan government subsequently lost funding for their Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, requiring them to look at the population of former militants residing within their borders, rather than the external security threat created from the inability to disarm and demobilize the displaced and refugee Hutu populations. This external threat would prove to be

¹⁰⁷ Clark, "Bringing Them All Back Home: The Challenges of DDR and Transitional Justice in Contexts of Displacement in Rwanda and Uganda," 242.

¹⁰⁸ Clark, "Bringing Them All Back Home: The Challenges of DDR and Transitional Justice in Contexts of Displacement in Rwanda and Uganda," 241.

¹⁰⁹ Waldorf, "Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Rwanda," 9.

important however, as the Second Congo War spilled across the Rwandan border into the Northern regions in 1996 but were defeated by the Rwandan Defense Force in 2001.¹¹⁰

Internal disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration within Rwandan also occurred on behalf of the United Nations and World Bank through the Multi-Country Program for Demobilization and Reintegration. The program served as a joint operation between the World Bank's International Development Association and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping and was implemented in the Great Lakes region of Eastern Africa which included Burundi, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.¹¹¹ The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program "sought to operationalize DDR strategy, and as such consisted of a set of guiding principals in support of national programs, special projects, and regional activities, provides criteria for country participation, and outlines a process for developing, financing, implementing, and monitoring disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration activities in the region."¹¹² Operations in Rwanda began in 2002 and aimed to supporting economic reintegration programs throughout the state and facilitate the reallocation of funds from the Rwandan government to different defense, social, and economic sector expenditures.¹¹³ The overall cost of the program was 53.31 million American dollars, in which most of the funding was allocated toward health and social protection programs.¹¹⁴ The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program provided monetary support for the RDRC to disarm,

¹¹⁰ Waldorf, "Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Rwanda," 6.

¹¹¹ Edmonds, Mills, and McNamee, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes."

¹¹² "Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilization and Reintegration," *The World Bank* (2002): 2.

¹¹³ "Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Project," The World Bank.

¹¹⁴ "Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Project," The World Bank.

demobilize, and reintegrate combatants into civil society and the economy, contributing to the overall effectiveness of the operation and its ability to deter the resurgence of conflict in the region.

The establishment of these two-coinciding disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs resulted in tremendous strides toward stability and peace from 1997 to 2008 in Rwanda, when the mandate of both program came to an end. According to reports released by the World Bank's Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project in 2012, the program managed to meet the following measurements of success:

1. "53.3% of former militants were reported to be socially accepted by their communities.
2. 67.1% of former militants were economically reintegrated.
3. 100% of former militants had their demand for demobilization services met.
4. 10,029 members of armed groups had been demobilized (2,938 by this project).
5. 26,585 RDF members had been demobilized.
6. 86 percent of ex-combatants had an ID card and medical insurance six months after demobilization.
7. 100 percent of severely disabled ex-combatants received their due benefits within nine months of demobilization.
8. 100 percent of ex-combatants have settled down in their community of choice with access to shelter and food security.
9. 7,932 resettlement kits were delivered to dependents of ex-armed group members.
10. 91 percent of demobilized individuals were satisfied with the services and information provided in the demobilization centers."¹¹⁵

¹¹⁵ "Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration in Rwanda," The World Bank, accessed on February 12, 2020. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2013/02/01/emergency-demobilization-and-reintegration-in-rwanda>.

The impact of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs in Rwanda, specifically those implemented and overseen by the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, created overall state stability and curbed violence within the country. Through the World Bank's own research, over ninety-eight percent of individuals who transitioned through their program rated it as effective and satisfactory in its ability to provide helpful information, strong vocational training, and ample employment opportunities during reintegration.¹¹⁶

To further understand the impact of peacebuilding mechanisms in Rwanda after 1994, specifically efforts to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate former combatants into civil society, it is helpful to recognize the changes to the overall stability of the nation and presence of violence among various communities between 1997 and 2008. One mechanism used to understand these changes is the *Fragile State Index*, which is funded by the *Fund for Peace* to measure political risk, stability, and the likelihood for conflict to arise.¹¹⁷ Although the program only began evaluating countries in 2005, the *Fragile State Index* demonstrates that from 2005 to 2007, Rwanda moved eighteen positions within the global ranking of the stability of countries – going from the twenty-fourth most fragile state in the world in 2005 to the forty-second ranked state in 2007.¹¹⁸ Although this ranking is influenced by the changes of other countries, and one state might move ahead of another due to escalation of conflict rather than improvements to governance and security in the other, the index demonstrates impressive growth for a state like Rwanda. The index also notes that from 2005 to 2007, Rwanda saw a consistent decrease to external and internal security threats, a steady decrease in ethnic and political divisions among

¹¹⁶ “Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration in Rwanda,” The World Bank.

¹¹⁷ “Fragile States Index: Rwanda Country Dashboard,” *Fund for Peace*, accessed March 29, 2020, <https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/>.

¹¹⁸ “Fragile State Index: Rwanda Country Dashboard,” *Fund for Peace*.

individuals within the state, and an overall decrease to human rights violations within the state.¹¹⁹

Along with this, since the *Fragile State Index* began, the *Fund for Peace* has reported that Rwanda has experienced significant economy growth, contributing to growing economic equality within the state from its former position during the Civil War and providing a budding economy for the reintegration of former militants and offering inexplicit economic incentive for the continuation of peace.¹²⁰

Promising reports regarding the state of violence in Rwanda after the implementation of demobilization and reintegration programs are also revealed in the *Uppsala Conflict Data Program* produced by the *Center of the Study of Civil War* at the *Peace Research Institute Oslo*. The *Uppsala Conflict Data Program* (UCDP) provides researchers information regarding the presence of state base violence, non-state violence, and one-sided violence throughout every country in the world.¹²¹ In Rwanda, the UCDP indicates that in 1997 when demobilization and reintegration began in Rwanda, the total number of deaths from internal conflict and violence was 4,698, and during the year of 2006 there were zero casualties reported from violence within the state.¹²² This demonstrates the ability of the Rwandan government to curb the presence of violence within the state, and highlights the success of their demobilization and reintegration program at deterring the resurgence of further conflict. It is important to address that despite the promising data the UCDP produced regarding Rwanda, much of the violence within the state in

¹¹⁹ "Fragile State Index: Rwanda Country Dashboard," *Fund for Peace*.

¹²⁰ "Fragile State Index: Rwanda Country Dashboard," *Fund for Peace*.

¹²¹ "Uppsala Conflict Data Program: Rwanda Profile," *Center of the Study of Civil War: Peace Research Institute Oslo*, accessed March 19, 2020, <https://ucdp.uu.se/country/517>.

¹²² "Uppsala Conflict Data Program: Rwanda Profile," *Center of the Study of Civil War: Peace Research Institute Oslo*.

the later 1990s, like the 4,698 individual deaths in 1997, are attributed to the outbreak of conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo.¹²³ When the Hutu genocidaires, some members of the ex-FAR, the Interahamwe, and the ousted Hutu government fled Rwanda in 1994, they found refuge in the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire) under the protection of President Mobutu Sese Seko.¹²⁴ While in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the ousted government of Rwanda founded the Rally for the Return of Refugees and Democracy in Rwanda (RDR) in 1995, whom established a military-like group consisting of former genocidaires and Interahamwe called the Armed People for the Liberation of Rwanda (PALIR).¹²⁵ Violence within Rwanda during the later 1990s can be attributed to the acts of the PALIR, whose members continued to fight the Rwandan government internally. In “Chapter Four: Neglect in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” the conflict within the DRC during the turn of the twenty-first century will be further investigated – linking disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts to the continuation of violence. In Rwanda, the presence of the PALIR was in part attended to through military force, however, individuals interested in demobilization and reintegration benefits were deemed eligible so long as they sought peace. In this regard, although the violence reported in 1997 by the UCDP was more frequently due to an external state-to-state conflict between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, internal violence with the republic did wean out to nonexistence by 2007.¹²⁶

¹²³ “Uppsala Conflict Data Program: Rwanda Profile,” *Center of the Study of Civil War: Peace Research Institute Oslo*.

¹²⁴ “Uppsala Conflict Data Program: Armed People for the Liberation of Rwanda Profile,” *Center of the Study of Civil War: Peace Research Institute Oslo*, accessed March 19, 2020, <https://ucdp.uu.se/actor/1128>.

¹²⁵ “Uppsala Conflict Data Program: Armed People for the Liberation of Rwanda Profile,” *Center of the Study of Civil War: Peace Research Institute Oslo*.

¹²⁶ “Uppsala Conflict Data Program: Rwanda Profile,” *Center of the Study of Civil War: Peace Research Institute Oslo*.

Rwanda serves as an informative case-study to the understanding of strong DDR programs. The hypothesis proposed in Chapter One of this investigation are relevant to the study of the republic, even if the state's peacebuilding operation does not align with the predicted results. The Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program reported that the local nature of the program contributed to its overall success. In the present-day, the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program is used as model for other post-conflict development programs. The success of Rwanda's state-operated program is often attributed to its emphasis on *ingando* during demobilization, demonstrating the importance of strong education programs.¹²⁷ In Rwanda, strong demobilization and reintegration programs that include intensive reeducation curriculums, strong vocational training modules, and temporary financial support on behalf of the government, demonstrated to be more important to the deterrence of violence than a disarmament program. Rwanda's inability to establish state-operated disarmament programs was attributed to a lack of funding for a robust and comprehensive operation that prevented the illicit sale of weapons after collection.¹²⁸ Along with this, ethnic tension between the Hutu and Tutsi continued to exist after the genocide; Hutus participating in demobilization and reintegration programs were initially against the process if it included disarmament, due to fears that the Tutsi-controlled Rwandan government would not uphold the 1993 Arusha Agreement and retaliate against the Hutu population as seen in Burundi in 1972.¹²⁹ Due to the state's inability to establish a disarmament program due to its historical and cultural contexts, more funding and attention was placed on the demobilization curriculum and success of reintegration. Thus, for the purpose

¹²⁷ Edmonds, Mills, and McNamee, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes."

¹²⁸ Alusala, "Disarmament and Reconciliation: Rwanda's Concern."

¹²⁹ Alusala, "Disarmament and Reconciliation: Rwanda's Concern."

of this investigation, the timing of the disarmament program in a state did not demonstrate to influence the success of the DDR program in Rwanda, as a formal disarmament program did not exist.

A holistic approach to demobilization and reintegration demonstrated to be successful in Rwanda, as the program included robust demobilization and reintegration operations that successfully reintegrated 57,538 former militants from the Rwandan Civil War and Genocide. Along with this, the program's ample allowance of funding from both the state and the international community contributed to its longevity and complexity, demonstrating flexibility for the various needs of the population. The failure of the international community to defend Rwanda from catastrophe in 1994 created a culture of guilt among members of the United Nations, thus, guaranteeing funding for the internal demobilization and reintegration of former combatants in Rwanda so long as the state remained absent from the Congolese affairs.¹³⁰ The Rwandan case study also reveals that the compliance of all participating parties in the conflict in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program is imperative to its success at deterring violence. In the case of Rwanda, the RPF, the RDF, and the ex-FAR's participation in demobilization camps resulted in a large population of former combatants that were committed to peace. The exodus of former genocidaires, Hutu militant groups, and the Interahamwe into the Democratic Republic of Congo resulted in the escalation of conflict in the DRC, rather than the inability for the Republic of Rwanda to stabilize after their perpetration of the genocide.

As a result of these factors, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in Rwanda

¹³⁰ Waldorf, "Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Rwanda," 9.

serves as a successful example of how robust DDR programs can contribute to the deterrence of violence. Although Rwanda lacks a formal disarmament program in congruence with demobilization and reintegration, the operation to transition former militants into civilian life does provide insight on the importance of timing, party participation, and funding for the success of DDR. Along with this, the lack of violence within Rwanda after the end of demobilization and reintegration and consistent economic growth within the state highlights the successful nature of the program and the positive conditions contributing to the reduction of incentives for conflict to redevelop. The initial goals of the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program, as evaluated by the World Bank International Development Association, was to demobilize approximately 45,000 former militants from the various armed groups in Rwanda and reintegrated them into civilian life.¹³¹ In the *International Center for Transitional Justice's* report on the data provided by the United Nations, World Bank, and the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program regarding the DDR operations from 1997 to 2007, an estimated 57,538 former militants within the state were demobilized and reintegrated – receiving support from both the international community and state government.¹³² Overall, the Rwandan government reintegrated more individuals than anticipated, demonstrating overwhelming success in the program's effectiveness and ability to curb violence throughout the state.

¹³¹ "Technical Annex for a Proposed Credit of SDR 20 Million to the Republic of Rwanda for an Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Program," The World Bank (March 25, 2002): 13.

¹³² "Technical Annex for a Proposed Credit of SDR 20 Million to the Republic of Rwanda for an Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Program," The World Bank: 13; Waldorf, "Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Rwanda," 8.

Chapter Three

Not Good Enough: DDR in Burundi

Just south of Rwanda, the Republic of Burundi faced similar struggles as the Tutsi and Hutu rivalry resulted in tragic conflict. Like Rwanda, Burundi shares a large population of ethnic Hutus and Tutsis, with a Hutu majority but a long history of Tutsi rule due to Belgian colonialism. Under the Belgian colonial rule, oppressive provisions divided the two ethnic groups, creating a toxic power dynamic that led to heinous violence as the country sought independence and the two populations competed for rule. When Burundi declared independence in 1962, attempted coups spearheaded by the Hutu population began against the Tutsi-run government, until 1972 when a large Hutu rebellion resulted in the death of thousands of Tutsis. The Tutsi led government and military began an ethnic cleansing campaign after the attempted Hutu rebellion, aimed at wiping out a potential class of Hutu leaders to ensure continued Tutsi control.¹³³ At the hands of the government, and estimated two-hundred and fifty thousand Hutu Burundians were killed.¹³⁴ This massive loss of life within the nation set the precedent for the way political change would play out in the nation for nearly two decades, until 1993 when the state carried out elections that resulted in a democratically elected Hutu president and legislative majority.¹³⁵ For the international community, a step toward democratization within Burundi seemed as a positive indicator that the country's history of violent politics was behind them, along with the end of the civil war. However, four months after Burundi elected the Hutu

¹³³ Stanley Meisler, *The United Nations: A History*, (New York, New York: Grove Press, 2011): 335.

¹³⁴ Oliver Furley and Roy May, *Peacekeeping in Africa*, (Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing, 1998): 254.

¹³⁵ Furley and May, *Peacekeeping in Africa*, 254.

President, Melchior Ndadaye, a Tutsi insurrection assassinated the executive and attempted a military coup – resulting in the resurgence of a civil war that many believed to be behind them.¹³⁶ After his assassination, Hutus retaliated against the Tutsi population, killing over twenty-five thousand members of the ethnic group and those who were sympathizers. The death of President Ndadaye resulted in a full scale war between the Tutsi dominated military and Hutu rebel groups, and only escalated further when the president of the Hutu dominated political party, Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU), was assassinated alongside President Habyarimana, the Hutu president of Rwanda, in 1994.¹³⁷ The conflict between participating Burundian Hutus and Tutsis resulted in the deaths of over two-hundred thousand citizens from 1993 to 1998, and created a displaced population of over six-hundred thousand Burundians whom migrated to states such as Tanzania, Zaire, (present day Democratic Republic of Congo), Rwanda, and Uganda.¹³⁸

Although the violence created from the Burundian Civil War sporadically lasted until 2006, efforts to curb the conflict within the nation began as early as 1996 when President Pierre Buyoya, who previously controlled the Republic of Burundi prior to the elections of 1993, seized power over the state in a Tutsi led coup d'état.¹³⁹ The Tutsi president began negotiations with the Hutu led legislature, where the FRODEBU remained in power despite the country's internal strife. These discussions were later mediated by the former president of Tanzania, Julius

¹³⁶ Furley and May, *Peacekeeping in Africa*, 254.

¹³⁷ "Modern Conflicts – Conflict Profile: Burundi (1993 – 2006)," *Political Economy Research Institute at the University of Massachusetts Amherst* (2020): http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/dpe/modern_conflicts/burundi.pdf.

¹³⁸ Furley and May, *Peacekeeping in Africa*, 254.

¹³⁹ "Modern Conflicts – Conflict Profile: Burundi (1993 – 2006)," *Political Economy Research Institute at the University of Massachusetts Amherst* (2020).

Nyerere, in 1998, and after his death were then overseen by President Nelson Mandela of South Africa in 1999.¹⁴⁰ In an effort to establish a peace agreement in Burundi, nineteen different political parties and representatives within the conflict were included in the creation of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of Burundi, which came to be colloquially known as the 2000 Arusha Agreement/Accords.¹⁴¹ All of the participating parties, and specifically the Hutu majority National Assembly and the Tutsi run Government of Burundi (led by President Buyoya) agreed on five specific protocols within the agreement...

1. Nature of the conflict.
2. Democracy and Good Governance: Constitution and Transitional Arrangements.
3. Questions of Peace and Security: Defense and Security Force Reforms and a Permanent Ceasefire.
4. Reconstruction and Development: Economic Matters.
5. Guarantees on Implementation of the Agreement.¹⁴²

According to the University of Massachusetts Political Economy Research Institute's Conflict Profile of the Burundi Civil War, the Arusha Agreement of 2000 established a "multi-party government and a multi-ethnic Burundian military with forces drawn from both rebelling groups and the state's original armed forces."¹⁴³ The agreement was signed in 2000, establishing a

¹⁴⁰ "Modern Conflicts – Conflict Profile: Burundi (1993 – 2006)," *Political Economy Research Institute at the University of Massachusetts Amherst* (2020).

¹⁴¹ The Government of the Republic of Burundi, et. al., "Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi," accessed April 15, 2020, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BI_000828_Arusha%20Peace%20and%20Reconciliation%20Agreement%20for%20Burundi.pdf.

¹⁴² The Government of the Republic of Burundi, et. al., "Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi."

¹⁴³ "Modern Conflicts – Conflict Profile: Burundi (1993 – 2006)," *Political Economy Research Institute at the University of Massachusetts Amherst* (2020).

transitional government; however, the provisions within the accords were not implemented fully until 2003, when the ceasefire officially began.¹⁴⁴

The Arusha Agreement of 2000 was meant to diminish violence within the state and set the country on a path toward true democratization. In an effort to secure the state, the Arusha Agreement required the implementation of five specific sub-provisions within the third section of the agreement...

1. All participating parties were required to ceasefire within seventy-two hours of the agreement's signing.
2. The agreement must be implemented immediately.
3. The ceasefire would be overseen by the Joint Liaison Teams, which was comprised of representatives from all nineteen parties, the United Nations, and the African Union.
4. The Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC), which presided over the deployed United Nations Peacekeeping Force, the reform within the Burundi Armed Forces to include all participating ethnic groups, and the implementation of a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration operations, would include members of the nineteen participating parties, the United Nations, and the African Union. These operations would begin immediately upon the implementation of the ceasefire agreement.
5. Members of armed political parties, movements, militias, and rebel groups would disarm prior to their participation in assembly and demobilization facilities.¹⁴⁵

Thus, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration operations within Burundi began with the implementation of the 2000 Arusha Accords in 2003, and came to an end on January 1st, 2007, when the African Union and the United Nations suspended their formal assistance to former assailants within the state. Between 2003 and 2004, participants of the conflict were permitted to voluntarily disarm and enlist in the military in an effort to create an ethnic balance of Hutus and

¹⁴⁴ Andy Knight, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Africa: AN Overview," *African Security* 1:1 (2008): 37.

¹⁴⁵ The Government of the Republic of Burundi, et. al., "Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi."

Tutsis in the state's armed forces (Burundian National Defense Force). Thus, the formal transition of former militants to civil society began in 2004 after the state created a heterogeneous military with fifty-fifty percent ethnic representation.¹⁴⁶ This provision, established within the 2000 Arusha Accords, required that one ethnic group could not be larger than fifty percent of the military's population for a period of time determined by the Senate.¹⁴⁷ Currently, the Burundian National Defense Force still contains a heterogeneous balance between the two ethnic groups, demonstrating as stabilizing mechanism within the nation and serving to destroy ethnic tension between the Hutus and Tutsis.¹⁴⁸

Each phase of the DDR operation in Burundi was overseen by a different governing body, however, the Burundian government played a critical role in the final implementation of the program. The state controlled approach received funding and added assistance from three organizations: The United Nations and the African Union as per the Arusha Accords, and the World Bank through their pre-existing Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program which played a vital role in DDR throughout the Great Lakes Region (and will later be discussed further in Chapter Four: The Democratic Republic of Congo).¹⁴⁹ The disarmament and registration phase of DDR in Burundi began under the oversight of the United Nations Operations in Burundi (ONUB) and the JCC, whom were both supervised by the Burundian

¹⁴⁶ Henri Boshoff and Waldemar Vrey, "A Technical Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: A Case Study from Burundi," *Institute for Security Studies Monograph Series* 125 (2006): 18.

¹⁴⁷ The Government of the Republic of Burundi, et. al., "Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi"; "Burundi: The Army in Crisis," *The International Crisis Group Report* 247 (2017): <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/burundi/247-burundi-army-crisis>.

¹⁴⁸ Gérard Prunier, "The Armies of the Great Lakes Countries," *Prism* 6:4 (2017): <https://cco.ndu.edu/News/Article/1171864/the-armies-of-the-great-lakes-countries/>.

¹⁴⁹ Rens Willems, Jesper Kleingeld, Mathijs van Leeuwen, "Connecting Community Security and DDR: Experiences from Burundi," *Peace Security and Development* 30 (2010): 10.

government.¹⁵⁰ After former combatants were disarmed, the Burundian National Commission of Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration (NCDRR) registered participants for demobilization, transporting individuals to facilities located in the seventeen different provinces throughout the state.¹⁵¹ The demobilization of former militants in Burundi was then finally implemented by the National Commission of Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration, with the participation of the World Bank's Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, the United Nations' Operation in Burundi, and the African Union's Mission in Burundi.¹⁵² During this process, militants received reinsertion packages which included an eighteenth month salary equivalent to the pay they would receive at their decided military rank, and one of five options for reintegration:

1. "To return to their former employer prior to the Civil War with subsidized employment and referral;"
2. "Return to a formal education in a Burundian school;"
3. "Receive vocational training for self-employment;"
4. "Receive Entrepreneurial Support;"
5. "(or) Receive Income Generated Activities Support, which included receiving the goods of their choice (food commodities, animals, or equipment) and information on how to set up a project with these tools whilst still residing at the demobilization center." ¹⁵³

This process resulted in the reunification of families across the country, the reintegration of Burundian militants into the national economy, and included separate requirements for

¹⁵⁰ Willems, Kleingeld, van Leeuwen, "Connecting Community Security and DDR: Experiences from Burundi," 10.

¹⁵¹ Willems, Kleingeld, van Leeuwen, "Connecting Community Security and DDR: Experiences from Burundi," 10.

¹⁵² Boshoff and Vrey, "A Technical Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: A Case Study from Burundi," 20.

¹⁵³ Willems, Kleingeld, van Leeuwen, "Connecting Community Security and DDR: Experiences from Burundi," 11; Boshoff and Vrey, "A Technical Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: A Case Study from Burundi," 24.

vulnerable members of the population like women, children, and the disabled, who required additional support from the government and participating international organizations.

During the formal period of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in the Republic of Burundi, participating parties contributed to efforts to stabilize the region and support non-state actor in their transition out of conflict and into civil society. The program's initial intention was to disarm and demobilize fifty-five thousand former militants; disarm twenty thousand members of the government militia (individuals not in the formal military, but claiming to support the Hutu government through militant violence and non-state organization); and dismantle the rebelling chain of command network.¹⁵⁴ According to Andy Knight, an expert in multilateral security, global governance, and the editor of *African Security*, the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration campaign in Burundi resulted in the demobilization of 21,379 former militants, the implementation of "security sector reform," and a "comprehensive social reintegration package" by the end of the year in 2006.¹⁵⁵ The United Nations reports on the program also indicated that 28,378 militias were demobilized under the DDR operations from 2003 to 2007, which included 18,709 members of the military police and 9,670 militant combatants.¹⁵⁶ Regarding disarmament, by the end of 2006 over five thousand and six hundred weapons were recovered during the DDR operation to the United Nations Operations in Burundi.¹⁵⁷ These weapons ranged from grenade launchers, RPG 7s, small arms, AK 47s, and

¹⁵⁴ Knight, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Africa," 37.

¹⁵⁵ Knight, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Africa," 38.

¹⁵⁶ "Country Overview: Burundi," The United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resource Center, accessed April 15, 2020, https://www.unddr.org/country-overview/burundi_2.aspx.

¹⁵⁷ Boshoff and Vrey, "A Technical Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: A Case Study from Burundi," 42.

light machine guns; under the supervision of the United Nations Operations in Burundi, these arms were then stored and destroyed.¹⁵⁸ Although the Joint Operations Plan between the Burundian government, the United Nations, and the World Bank did successfully reintegrate former combatants, the program's initial goal aimed at transitioning fifty-five thousand former militants through disarmament and demobilization.¹⁵⁹ Of the target population of fifty-five thousand, the program within Burundi only demobilized 19,739 former militants, which accounts for a little more than a third of the operations goal, or thirty-five percent. Thus, although the program did demonstrate success in its ability to support the individuals that underwent DDR, it was unable to assist the other two-thirds of the target population and complete its goal.

The state experienced challenges curbing violence and protecting Burundian civilians from continued conflict after the implementation of the 2000 Arusha Accords. When the accords were implemented in 2003, one group, the Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL), were outside of the agreement throughout the majority of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process.¹⁶⁰ The FNL represented a Hutu militia group with an estimated population of three thousand, and operated as a guerrilla movement within the country during the peace process.¹⁶¹ Although the FNL finally came to an agreement with the Burundian government in 2006 through the establishment of the Dar es Salaam Agreement, failure to implement the provisions

¹⁵⁸ Boshoff and Vrey, "A Technical Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: A Case Study from Burundi," 20.

¹⁵⁹ Knight, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Africa," 38.

¹⁶⁰ Martin Edmonds, Greg Mills, and Terance McNamee, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes: The Experience of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo," *African Security* 2:1 (2009).

¹⁶¹ Edmonds, Mills, and McNamee, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes."

immediately through a joint task force hindered the opportunity for peace in the region.¹⁶²

Although intending to move toward peace through the Dar es Salaam Agreement, defections from the FNL continued to operate in rural communities throughout the state, like Ruyaga, Isale, and Mubimbi.¹⁶³ Along with this, distrust among participating parties of the 2000 Arusha Agreement hindered the success of disarmament in the nation. Due to the continuation of low-level conflict, many former militants refused to participate in disarmament despite their interest in demobilizing.¹⁶⁴ The desire to protect themselves combined with a history of violence in politics created a culture of fear throughout Burundian communities, regardless of their identity as a Hutu or Tutsi.¹⁶⁵ The presence of these arms created instability in the region, however, violence in Burundi was likely only going to cease as Burundians were disarmed. The inability for the Burundian government to curb violence in the region for parties like the FNL, contributed to the capability of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration operations in the nation to be successful as decreasing armed conflict in the region.

Through the analysis of the specific provisions of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration operations in Burundi after the implementation of the 2000 Arusha Agreement, it is obvious that another hinderance to the program's success was its inability to be efficiently implemented in a timely manner. In 2003 when the ceasefire of the 2003 Arusha Agreement was implemented, conflict within the state had not fully subsided and violence continued until former

¹⁶² Edmonds, Mills, and McNamee, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes."

¹⁶³ Boshoff and Vrey, "A Technical Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: A Case Study from Burundi," 5.

¹⁶⁴ Knight, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Africa," 37.

¹⁶⁵ Knight, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Africa," 37.

militants were assembled into their demobilization camps.¹⁶⁶ Equipped to be implemented immediately after the ceasefire, the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program lost credibility among former militants who already experienced a distrust for other participating parties in the agreement. As mentioned early, this distrust contributed to the refusal to disarm among various parties of former militants seeking the benefits associated with demobilizing.

The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program in Burundi was also limited by the operation's inability to continue an adequate cash flow to satisfy the budget of the program.¹⁶⁷ The international community, whom was largely funding the operation, often delayed their payments to the Burundian government.¹⁶⁸ Due to this delay, former combatants often experienced infrequent payments of their benefits package associated with their compliance in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process.¹⁶⁹ Along with this, delays from the United Nations often influenced the ability for the African Union to implement their assistance in the DDR process, as they relied on the funding of the UN. As a result, the program experienced interruptions in its ability to assist former militants through their transitions.¹⁷⁰ The flexibility of financing the campaign in Burundi revealed to be crucial for the program's ability to successfully reintegrate former militants into the civilian sector. Although disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration was overseen by the state, the international

¹⁶⁶ Boshoff and Vrey, "A Technical Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: A Case Study from Burundi," 47.

¹⁶⁷ Boshoff and Vrey, "A Technical Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: A Case Study from Burundi," 42.

¹⁶⁸ Willems, Kleingeld, van Leeuwen, "Connecting Community Security and DDR: Experiences from Burundi," i.

¹⁶⁹ Willems, Kleingeld, van Leeuwen, "Connecting Community Security and DDR: Experiences from Burundi," i.

¹⁷⁰ Boshoff and Vrey, "A Technical Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: A Case Study from Burundi," 30.

actors like the United Nations and the World Bank largely funded the program and thus their ability to flexibly distribute money proved to be the key, as often the task forces implementing the program adapted to different circumstances over the period between 2003 and 2007.¹⁷¹ The inability for the funding of these operations to be flexible, combined with the finite nature of funding for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in the Republic of Burundi, resulted in the ending of the program. Although many Burundians had undergone reintegration through the operation, the ending of the program in 2007 was too early, as DDR only accounted for the reintegration of one-third of the target population of former militants within the country. Two-thirds of the target population within Burundi still required demobilization assistance and economic incentives to cease their pursuance of political or economic gain through violent means. An increase in funding within the state would have likely helped achieve their initial goal.

The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process in Burundi required the involvement of multiple different actors and a strong relationship between the national government and the international community. In Burundi, the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program financed by the World Bank worked alongside the Burundian National Commission of Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration, which oversaw the coordinated efforts of the United Nations and the African Union to halt violence and decrease the likelihood of resurgence in the state. Although the joint DDR programs within Burundi only successfully reintegrated one-third of the target population of former militants in the state, the operation was

¹⁷¹ “DDR in Peace Operations: A Retrospective,” The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions Report 2020, accessed April 15, 2020: 21. https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/ddr_retrospective102010.pdf.

successful in the ability for the government to support those individuals as a result of the strength of the state control over the process, the commitment of the participating parties to the provisions set by the 2000 Arusha Agreement (with one exception), and the strength of the demobilization and the reintegration packages to provide incentive for former militants to integrate into the formal economy and civil society. According to the *Fragile State Index*, Burundi demonstrated positive improvements decreasing violence and increasing stability within the state. In 2005, Burundi was ranked fifteenth among one hundred and seventy eight countries for fragility, and in 2007 the state moved down in rank to twenty-four, indicating positive improvements.¹⁷² Initially receiving a Fragile State Index of 96.7 in 2005, Burundi improved in 2007 to a score of 94.1.¹⁷³ In comparison to the *Fragile State Index*, the Peace Research Institute - Oslo's Data on Armed Conflict indicates similar trends regarding the decrease in violence and armed conflict during the period of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in Burundi. The Data on Armed Conflict suggests that from 2003 to 2006, a significant decrease in casualties occurred as each year passed.¹⁷⁴ In 2003, Burundi experienced a total of 1,245 recorded deaths from state based violence, non-state actors, and one sided violence; between the beginning of 2006 to the beginning of 2007, when the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration campaign transitioned out of Burundi, only 185 people were reported dead due to violence within the state related to armed conflict.¹⁷⁵ Both the *Fragile State Index* and the Data on Armed Conflict by the

¹⁷² "Fragile States Index: Burundi Country Dashboard," *Fund for Peace*, accessed March 29, 2020, <https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/>.

¹⁷³ "Fragile States Index: Burundi Country Dashboard," *Fund for Peace*.

¹⁷⁴ "Uppsala Conflict Data Program: Burundi Profile," *Center of the Study of Civil War: Peace Research Institute Oslo*, accessed April 15, 2020, <https://ucdp.uu.se/country/516>.

¹⁷⁵ "Uppsala Conflict Data Program: Burundi Profile," *Center of the Study of Civil War: Peace Research Institute Oslo*.

Peace Research Institute - Oslo demonstrate that the peacebuilding efforts of the Burundian National Commission of Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration, the United Nations Operations to Burundi, the African Union, and the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program resulted in positive developments to the state of violence within Burundi's borders.

Similar to Rwanda, robust demobilization and reintegration programs in Burundi demonstrated to be effective in reducing the presence of violence in the state. However, comparatively, Burundi's implementation of disarmament provided the state with positive developments that Rwanda did not seem to require. For the purpose of this investigation, the success of DDR in Burundi would not be attributed to the implementation of the operation within a year of the peace accords, as the Arusha Agreement was signed in 2000, the ceasefire began in 2003, and the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former militants into civil society did not begin until 2004. Although swift implementation of the ceasefire and formal DDR process would have likely benefitted Burundi, a ceasefire agreement among participating parties was unlikely to occur prior to 2003 due to the need for the establishment of peacebuilding institutions and a transitional government. The second hypothesis in this analysis of successful characteristics of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs is sustainable for Burundi with one exception. In the Republic of Burundi, the participation of the nineteen warring parties in the creation and implementation of the Arusha Agreement was crucial to the success of DDR in the region. Without their participation, former militants were unlikely to willingly demobilize and seek economic reintegration, as the incentives to continue the conflict would have outweighed the reward of disarmament. The FNL's exclusion from the peace agreement contributed to the state's inability to fully curb violence from the Civil War, thus contributing

further to distrust among civilians and former militants in the DDR program's ability to build peace. Had the FNL participated in the Arusha Agreement and sought economic gain and political participation consequently to disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating, the state would have experienced further stability.

The hypotheses proposed in Chapter One of this investigation also included a provision regarding the success of DDR programs in Eastern Africa with strong reintegration packages that included vocational training. In Burundi, reinsertion packages provided former militants monetary support alongside five different options for reintegration, which varied to meet the needs of different demographics of Burundians. This process included strong vocational training and often guaranteed former militants and their families a pathway to receive further income alongside reinsertion packages. In Burundi, strong reintegration programs with quality vocational training incentivized former militants to remain disarmed and demobilized and participate in the formal economy. Lastly, the fourth hypothesis for this analysis identifies that proper funding for each dimension of DDR correlates to the success of the program in its efforts to build peace and curb violence. In Burundi, the Burundian National Commission of Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration, experienced fluctuations in the funding for the program from the international community, however, each dimension of DDR was proportionally funded to support former militants through their transition into the civil sector. As a result, Burundi serves as a strong example for other countries implementing DDR as their state-controlled approach to allocating funds showed to be successful at reducing violence in the nation.

Burundi serves as a moderately successful case study for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in Eastern Africa despite its shortcomings in various areas, like timing, funding, and party participation. Although the FNL continued its campaign against the state after

the 2003 ceasefire, the Dar es Salaam Agreement included provisions to allow for members of the FNL to integrate into the Burundian Armed Forces – thus participating in the security of the state.¹⁷⁶ After the end of the DRR operations in Burundi, the FNL was considered a decreasing threat. In 2008, the FNL was categorized as a small guerilla force, “motivated by alleviating poverty and acquiring income” rather than political means.¹⁷⁷ In December of 2008, the national government signed a peace agreement with the FNL formally ending conflict in the region.¹⁷⁸ Although the FNL was not included in the Burundian National Commission of Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration, without a strong DDR program the government likely would never have been able to reach an agreement with the militant group. Thus, Burundi serves as a moderately successful example of the ability for a strong disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration campaign to result in the reduction of violence in a nation, despite only achieving the transition of one-third of its target population.

The relative success of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, as well as the decreasing presence of violence within the Republic of Burundi, was short lived. The Arusha Accord’s provisions requiring an ethnically balanced, power sharing government and military encouraged reconciliation among the Hutus and the Tutsis.¹⁷⁹ Although ethnic violence dwindled, an outbreak of state-sanctioned violence, roll backs on political rights and civil

¹⁷⁶ Edmonds, Mills, and McNamee, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes.”

¹⁷⁷ Edmonds, Mills, and McNamee, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes.”

¹⁷⁸ “Uppsala Conflict Data Program: Burundi Profile,” *Center of the Study of Civil War: Peace Research Institute Oslo*.

¹⁷⁹ Julia Grauvogel, “Burundi after the 2015 Elections: A Conference Report,” *African Spectrum* 51:2 (2016): 4.

liberties, and democratic backsliding became an increasing concern for the international community in April of 2015, when the President of Burundi, Pierre Nkurunziza, announced an unconstitutional campaign for a third term in office.¹⁸⁰ Although the Arusha Accords included requirements on the number of terms for president's to serve in Burundi, the document failed as a safeguard against constitutional abuse. Prior to this crisis in the young democracy, Burundi demonstrated traits of democratic erosion and authoritarian rule, however, this largely went unnoticed from 2007 to 2015 due to the success of post-conflict peacebuilding within the state and the lack of interethnic conflict. In June of 2015, a faction within the Burundian National Defense Force attempted a coup d'état against President Nkurunziza, escalating the situation further despite their failure.¹⁸¹ In July of 2015, President Nkurunziza was reelected and currently serves as the state's executive today. After the election of his third term, opposition across the nation broke out and was met with repressive violence on behalf of the state. Since 2015, the *Human Rights Watch* has reported that crimes against humanity have occurred throughout the country, the government has terminated the operations of over one hundred and thirty non-for-profits, high profile assassination have occurred, and rebel group violence against the government has resurged.¹⁸² Violence within Burundi has hindered economic growth and civilian security within the state, and many of the effects of the growing humanitarian crisis are the result of growing authoritarianism and government mismanagement.

¹⁸⁰ "Burundi," *The International Crisis Group* (2020): <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/burundi>.

¹⁸¹ Tomas Van Acker, "Understanding Burundi's Predicament," *Egmont Institute* (2015): 1.

¹⁸² "Burundi: Events of 2018," *The Human Rights Watch*, accessed April 15, 2020, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/burundi>.

The current state in Burundi relates to the effectiveness of their national disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program. Although the peace building mechanism cannot take all of the blame, the inability for the operation to transition a larger portion of former militants in civil society resulted in instability within various communities. Like most peacebuilding programs, the efforts that the United Nations, the World Bank, the African Union, and the National Government of Burundi employed within the state conveniently excluded the repatriation of Burundian refugees from border states like Tanzania from the initial process.¹⁸³ The unsolved challenges created out of the Burundian Civil War and the inability for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration to adequately curb violence within the state influenced the process of democratic erosion that Burundi has experienced in the last decade. Along with this, instability within the Democratic Republic of Congo due to the mass exodus of Hutu militants and genocidaires from both Burundi and Rwanda have contributed to the resurgence of conflict within Burundi, as militant groups have crossed into the state in acts of aggression. The failure of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in part on behalf of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, has resulted in international consequences on the safety of East Africans residing in the Great Lakes Region. This failure will be further explained in the following chapter, in an effort to understand what factors contribute to the overall success of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs at curbing violence in Eastern Africa. The current political instability and humanitarian crisis in Burundi, combined with the overall inability for the Burundian National Commission of Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration, the World Bank's Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, the United Nations' Operation in Burundi,

¹⁸³ Burundi: Events of 2018," The Human Rights Watch.

and the African Union's Mission in Burundi to transition two-thirds of their target population, demonstrates that DDR in Burundi was moderately effective in curbing violence, but cannot be considered an overwhelming, or even complete, success.

Chapter Four

Failure in Central Africa: The Democratic Republic of Congo

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration intentions in the Democratic Republic of Congo unraveled in comparison to the state's regional neighbors Rwanda and Burundi. In the DRC, regional stability and the curtailing of violence failed, creating an uncertain environment for the success of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs. In 1994 over one million and five hundred thousand Rwandan Hutus and former members of the *Forces Armees Rwandaise* crossed the border of Zaire, creating a mini state within the Kivu Province and destabilizing much of the already vulnerable Eastern region of the country.¹⁸⁴ Within the Kivu Province, genocidaires largely controlled the finances and administration of the makeshift Hutu settlements, alongside creating recruitment training camps and large weapon stockpiles to convince the remaining portion of the Hutu population that their return to their homeland would result in certain death at the hands of the Tutsi's in power.¹⁸⁵ However, prior to the influx of Rwandan Hutus to the region, Kivu already had experience with conflict exploiting ethnic tensions as many of the provinces population had undergone massacre and war over who the land historically belonged to and who should lay claim to its control.¹⁸⁶ In 1993, the Hunde and Nyanga nations in Kivu ordered for the cleansing of the Banyarwanda population, a heinous action rooted in a long and drawn out history of conflict in the area.¹⁸⁷ The massacres and

¹⁸⁴ Martin Meredith, *The Fate of Africa: A History of the Continent Since Independence* (New York, New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 526.

¹⁸⁵ Meredith, *The Fate of Africa*, 526.

¹⁸⁶ Meredith, *The Fate of Africa*, 529.

¹⁸⁷ Meredith, *The Fate of Africa*, 529.

violence that plagued the region thus were vulnerable to further destabilization when over one and a half million Hutu's from Rwanda arrived. Instability in Zaire, continued conflict against the Banyarwanda, and genocidaire control over refugee camps in the Kivu Provinces led to President Paul Kagame of Rwanda's invasion of the country of Zaire in 1996; igniting a conflict involving over twenty different rebel groups and the militaries of nine different states.¹⁸⁸ The conflict in Zaire, now presently known as the Democratic Republic of Congo, was not one that was easily halted by the implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs. Instead, it is widely accepted by international experts regarding the field of peacebuilding and development that the Democratic Republic of Congo was a failure and continues to experience instability in the present day.

The growing conflict in Zaire resulted in the collapse of Kinshasa and the fall of Mobutu Sese Seko's dictatorship in May of 1997.¹⁸⁹ Despite the severing ethnic tensions and regime collapse in Zaire, the state did not erode into multiple secessions or succumb to the increasingly difficult obstacles that its large state capacity created.¹⁹⁰ At the fall of Kinshasa, Zaire was renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo and President Laurent-Desire Kabila retained governing powers. Kabila's reign soon exacerbated disagreements with President Paul Kagame in Rwanda, resulting in the involvement of national regional powers like Uganda, Burundi, Angola, and Zimbabwe and creating a much larger, pan-African conflict with an increasingly

¹⁸⁸ Jason K. Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa*, (New York, New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 5.

¹⁸⁹ Mel McNulty, "The Collapse of Zaire: Implosion, Revolution or External Sabotage?" *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 37:1 (1999): 53.

¹⁹⁰ McNulty, "The Collapse of Zaire," 53.

destabilized DRC.¹⁹¹ As President Kabila lost his grip of the nation and violence continued in the Kivu regions, international actors utilized instability in the largest county on the continent for the opportunity to exploit it for its plentiful and diverse natural resources like cobalt, coltan, copper, and diamonds. The situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo escalated out of control, inevitably resulting in the assassination of President Kabila in January of 2001 and the succession of his son, Joseph Kabila, to take control of the executive office.¹⁹² As violence continued, the second president of the Democratic Republic of Congo oversaw the negotiation of a peace deal in 2002 that created a coalition government including many Congolese faction representatives and the removal of foreign militaries from the nation's territory. By 2002, over three million people had died at the hands of the Congolese Civil War, however, coverage of the conflict lacked international attention as the West demonstrated disinterest in the unclear enemy that killed the Congolese primarily through starvation and disease.¹⁹³ Parties involved in the conflict came to agreement in 2002 through the South Africa Sun City Peace Accords, which outlined a path for the country to achieve democratic elections by 2006 and called for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of different militant groups across the Democratic Republic of Congo.¹⁹⁴ The peace agreement, too, established a unified Congolese military known as the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo, or the FARDC.¹⁹⁵ In

¹⁹¹ Meredith, *The Fate of Africa*, 539.

¹⁹² Meredith, *The Fate of Africa*, 543.

¹⁹³ Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 5.

¹⁹⁴ Martin Edmonds, Greg Mills, and Terence McNamee, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes: The Experience of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo," *Journal of African Security* 2:1 (2009).

¹⁹⁵ Edmonds, Mills, and McNamee, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership."

2002, when the “Program of Implementation of the Peace Agreement Between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo on the Withdrawal of the Rwandan Troops the Dismantling of the Ex-FAR and Interahamwe Forces,” peace in Central Africa seemed attainable.¹⁹⁶

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in the Democratic Republic of Congo began in 2002 as a regional peacebuilding program to combat violence in both the country and the larger region of the East African Great Lakes.¹⁹⁷ The program included funding from the World Bank International Development Association and thirteen other international partners, and the coordination of regional governments like the African Union, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi.¹⁹⁸ The program established the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, worked in coordination with the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo to encourage former militants to transition back into the civilian and economic sector through the Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Program.¹⁹⁹ This program worked to support former militants through vocational training, reinsertion packages, reintegration packages, and the option for combatants to leave their local militant groups and enlist in the state military if they so desired.²⁰⁰ The reintegration process was implemented in 2002 alongside a disarmament grant created by the United Nations Development Program of ten million United States Dollars

¹⁹⁶ Republic of South Africa Department of Foreign Affairs, “Peace Agreements: Democratic Republic of the Congo – Rwanda,” Report from *United States Institute of Peace*, September 23, 2002. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2002/09/peace-agreements-democratic-republic-congo-drc-rwanda>.

¹⁹⁷ “Demobilization and Reintegration in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” Report from *The World Bank*, March 11, 2013, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2013/03/11/demobilization-and-reintegration-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo>.

¹⁹⁸ “Demobilization and Reintegration in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” *The World Bank*, March 11, 2013.

¹⁹⁹ “Demobilization and Reintegration in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” *The World Bank*, March 11, 2013.

²⁰⁰ “Demobilization and Reintegration in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” *The World Bank*, March 11, 2013.

and the assistance of the United Nations Children Fund whom oversaw the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process of child soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo whom were largely ignored by the World Bank's funded program.²⁰¹

The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program was in operation from 2003 to 2009, receiving over five hundred million dollars in funding for its operation in the Great Lakes Region.²⁰² Unlike other disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs in the Democratic Republic of Congo after the signing of the South Africa Sun City Peace Accords, the MDRP included the participation of seven different countries who all participated in the conflict across the Democratic Republic of Congo during the 1990s and early 2000s.²⁰³ These seven countries – Angola, the Central African Republic, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, the Republic of Congo, and the Democratic Republic of Congo – participated in the oversight and implementation of the program, resulting in a multi-organizational and inter-governmental approach to peacebuilding in the region. With specific focus on the demobilization and reintegration of participating Congolese in the DRC, the MDRP required national oversight of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs, despite receiving funding from organizations like the World Bank. This posed significant challenges for the Democratic Republic of Congo, whom after extended periods of conflict and government corruption at the hands of President Mobutu Sese Seko, suffered from fractured infrastructure and weakened

²⁰¹“Demobilization and Reintegration in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” *The World Bank*, March 11, 2013.

²⁰² “The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program Final Report: Overview of Program Achievements,” From the *World Bank*, July 2010, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/481721468149096857/pdf/564580WP0MDRP110Box349496B01PUBLIC1.pdf>.

²⁰³ “The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program Final Report,” *World Bank*, July 2010.

institutions.²⁰⁴ With the government struggling to maintain legitimacy in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the MDRP struggled to receive satisfactory results in comparison to countries like Rwanda and Burundi, which demonstrated strong state authority and implementation.

In 2003, there were approximately three hundred thousand militants present in the Democratic Republic of Congo.²⁰⁵ The Multi-State Demobilization and Reintegration Program's goal aimed to transition over one hundred and fifty thousand of those militants into civil society, and attempted to reinsert the remaining Congolese fighters into the state's newly unified armed forces.²⁰⁶ However, by 2008 over seventy thousand individuals still required transitioning; these individuals specifically coming President Mobutu's former Presidential Guard, various members of the Mai-Mai, smaller individual militias, and the Division Speciale Presidentielle (DSP).²⁰⁷ Along with this, individuals who were interested in joining the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo experienced instability as the newly established military became vulnerable to ethnic and economic divisions among inducted soldiers, as well as human rights violations on behalf of poor vetting processes for incoming fighters.²⁰⁸ The instability of the military within the Democratic Republic of Congo in the early 2000s resulted in desertion and fractures within

²⁰⁴ "The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program Final Report," *World Bank*, July 2010.

²⁰⁵ "Democratic Republic of Congo: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Reform of the Army," *Amnesty International Report* (2007): 6. <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/60000/afr620012007en.pdf>.

²⁰⁶ "Democratic Republic of Congo: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Reform of the Army," *Amnesty International Report* (2007): 7.

²⁰⁷ Edmonds, Mills, and McNamee, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership."

²⁰⁸ "DR Congo: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) and the Reform of the Army," *Amnesty International*, published on Relief Web, accessed March 29, 2020, <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/dr-congo-disarmament-demobilization-and-reintegration-ddr-and>.

the armed forces that contributed to resurgences of violence in territories like the Kivus, Ituri, and Katanga, where the federal government lacked strength and oversight.²⁰⁹ For those participating in the MDRP that did not reintegrate into the military, but chose to join the civilian sector, failure for the government to secure the region from on violence behalf of excluded armed groups from the peace agreement, resulted in a dangerous environment that encouraged militant recruiting and resurgence from those who underwent the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process but failed to see results.²¹⁰

The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program in the Great Lakes Region was one of two DDR programs in the Democratic Republic of Congo after the signage of the South Africa Sun City Peace Accords in 2002. Although the United Nations worked alongside the World Bank through UNDP and UNICEF, their prior peacekeeping mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo also implemented their own program in the region that transitioned towards a goal of peacebuilding and development. The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) began implementing a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration campaign in 2002 in an effort to stabilize the Ituri region of the DRC where many different armed militia groups had congregated.²¹¹ The program included disarming former militants and requiring participating parties to attend “transit, orientation, and

²⁰⁹ “DR Congo: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) and the Reform of the Army,” *Amnesty International*, accessed March 29, 2020.

²¹⁰ Joanne Richards, “Implementing DDR in Settings of Ongoing Conflict: The Organization and Fragmentation of Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 5:1 (2016).

²¹¹ “United Nations Organization Stabilization Missions in the DR Congo: DDR,” *The United Nations*, accessed March 29, 2020, <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/ddr>.

regrouping centers.”²¹² Here, former militants were given the choice between full civilian reintegration or enlisting the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo, or the state military of the Democratic Republic of Congo.²¹³ After attending these camps, those interested in reintegrating into the civilian and economic sector received different resettlement and reintegration packages. According to the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Overview Report, those who received reintegration and reinsertion packages also received access to “exit kits, safety nets, transportation, and assistance from the UNDP and UNICEF, whom were also working alongside the World Bank’s regional stability program.”²¹⁴ This program developed into what is now known as the Commission Nationale de Demobilisation et Reinsertion (CONADER) and has continued into the present day, handling the reintegration of over one hundred and fifty thousand former Congolese militants both reinserting into the state military or civil society. The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo continued to function in the DRC through the state’s first democratic elections in nearly half a century in 2006.²¹⁵ Despite this achievement, the program continued until 2010 when violence in the Eastern Regions of the country resulted in the Security Council’s implementation of Resolution 1925, which transformed MONUC to MONUSCO, or the United Nations Organization

²¹² “United Nations Organization Stabilization Missions in the DR Congo: DDR,” *The United Nations*, accessed March 29, 2020.

²¹³ “United Nations Organization Stabilization Missions in the DR Congo: DDR,” *The United Nations*, accessed March 29, 2020.

²¹⁴ “United Nations Organization Stabilization Missions in the DR Congo: DDR,” *The United Nations*, accessed March 29, 2020.

²¹⁵ “United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo: Background,” *The United Nations*, accessed March 29, 2020, <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/background>.

Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo.²¹⁶ Despite the ability for CONADER to reintegrate nearly one hundred and fifty thousand former Congolese militants, the program initially has a target population of 366,227 former combatants.²¹⁷

Notwithstanding their overall failure in curtailing violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program and the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo resulted in a variety of successes prior to 2010. According to the World Bank's report of the program, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in the Great Lakes Region brought the following to the DRC...

1. "Approximately 209,605 ex-combatants went through a verification process, 66,814 of whom joined the national army, and 140,000 of whom were demobilized by March 2011.
2. Surveys suggest 50 percent of ex-combatants have improved their livelihoods since demobilization, and as of September 2011, 64.7 percent were engaged in productive economic activity or schooling one year after demobilization.
3. Approximately 31,738 of 39,000 targeted children were removed from armed forces and reunited with parents by September 2011.
4. A total of 118,459 weapons were collected by September 2011.
5. A total of 821 economic associations were created to catalyze economic growth and social capital formation by September 2011.
6. Over 80 percent of the demobilized benefited from reintegration assistance."²¹⁸

The World Bank's Report of the performance of the MDRP also indicates that despite its success in demobilizing and reintegrating a portion of the Democratic Republic of Congo's population, the country remained as one of the Fund For Peace's twenty most at risk countries for violence in 2007, evaluated through the *Fragile State Index*.²¹⁹ In 2009, when the program

²¹⁶ "United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo: Background," *The United Nations*, accessed March 29, 2020, <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/background>.

²¹⁷ "Ending War, Building Peace: Contribution of the National DDR Program in DRC to Peace in the African Great Lakes Region," *Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program Report 77425* (2012): 6.

²¹⁸ "Demobilization and Reintegration in the Democratic Republic of Congo," *The World Bank*, March 11, 2013.

²¹⁹ "Demobilization and Reintegration in the Democratic Republic of Congo," *The World Bank*, March 11, 2013.

ended, the Democratic Republic of Congo was ranked as the fifth most fragile state worldwide with a high presence of violence, stagnant economy, and low state legitimacy.²²⁰ The MDRP faced many challenges that resulted in its failure to curb violence in the DRC, but among them, the weakness of the federal government and the inability for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs in the state to adequately curtail violence in the DRC resulted in a fragile state that continues to be ranked fifth among the most instable and violent countries worldwide.²²¹

MONUC's transition into MONUSCO resulted in the largest current United Nations peacekeeping force, with a budget of over one billion United States dollars each year.²²² Due to the programs transition, it lacks a clear result on the success that the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration projects created in the region prior to 2010. However, from 2008 to 2012, as the program experienced its transition, the United Nations failed to curtail violence in the Eastern Region of the DRC as the mission of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program became undefined.²²³ Lack of direction in their efforts to stabilize the region resulted in the ignorance of peace accords by various armed groups in regions like Goma,

²²⁰ "Fragile States Index: Democratic Republic of Congo Country Dashboard," *Fund for Peace*, accessed March 29, 2020, <https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/>.

²²¹ Richards, "Implementing DDR in Settings of Ongoing Conflict: The Organization of Fragmentation of Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo" ; "Fragile States Index: Democratic Republic of Congo Country Dashboard," *Fund for Peace*, accessed March 29, 2020.

²²² Edmonds, Mills, and McNamee, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership."

²²³ "Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Missions in the DRC/ MONUC-MONUSCO," published by *The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs* (2019), accessed March 29, 2020, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Assessing-the-effectiveness-of-the-United-Nations-Mission-in-the-DRC-MONUC-%E2%80%93MONUSCO.pdf>.

while the United Nations also struggled to collaborate with the young Congolese government.²²⁴ After the United Nations acknowledged the need to evolve the framework of MONUC in 2010, MONUSCO transformed from a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration focused program to one whose main mission was to establish “Stabilization Support Units” throughout the country.²²⁵ These Stabilization Support Units worked with the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo to establish strong state institutions, a judiciary, and security force.²²⁶ This shift focused the United Nations’ mission on the deterrence of continued violence, rather than long-term peacebuilding initiatives like DDR. MONUC also faced challenges curbing violence in the Eastern Region of the DRC due to the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda’s unwillingness to return to Rwanda after the peace agreement in 2002.²²⁷ Their unwillingness to leave resulted in continued violence, highlighting the importance of an inclusive peace agreement in cases where federal governments lack strong capacities for control. MONUC and MDRP failed in their ability to fully reduce violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which also contributed to a humanitarian crisis as disease and starvation continued across the country.

The failure for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs to incentivize former combatants to peacefully remain transitioned into civil society or the Congolese Armed Forces contributed to the continuation of violence throughout the state.

²²⁴ “Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Missions in the DRC/ MONUC-MONUSCO,” *The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs* (2019), accessed March 29, 2020.

²²⁵ “Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Missions in the DRC/ MONUC-MONUSCO,” *The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs* (2019), accessed March 29, 2020.

²²⁶ “Stabilization Support Unit,” The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, accessed on April 15, 2020, <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/stabilization-support-unit>.

²²⁷ Edmonds, Mills, and McNamee, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership.”

According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), during 2002, when the Sun City Peace Accords were signed, 7,877 Congolese lost their lives to state-based violence, non-state violence, and one-sided violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo.²²⁸ This is an increase in comparison to 2001, the year before, in which 1,341 Congolese reportedly lost their lives due to the continuation of conflict.²²⁹ From 2002 to 2008, the number of Congolese casualties from internal conflict decreased, with 1,736 individuals reported dead in 2008.²³⁰ However, in 2007, only 880 Congolese lost their lives to the violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which demonstrates that as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration operations began to falter, acts of aggression increased. This is also noticeable in the *Fragile State Index*. Although the index did not begin reporting until 2005, and thus does not include measurements regarding the Democratic Republic of Congo's fragility in the first three years of the implementation of DDR programs, it does indicate that in the last two years of the operations the country increased in its ranking, going from the sixth most instable state in 2007 to the fifth in 2008.²³¹ This instability has only continued throughout the twenty-first century, as the *Fragile State Index's* current report on the Democratic Republic of Congo ranks the nation fifth in fragility. The presence of violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo has failed to halt, despite the attempts made by the United Nations and the World Bank through the implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.

²²⁸ "Uppsala Conflict Data Program: Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) Conflict Profile," *Center of the Study of Civil War: Peace Research Institute Oslo*, accessed March 19, 2020, <https://ucdp.uu.se/country/490>.

²²⁹ Uppsala Conflict Data Program: Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) Conflict Profile," *Center of the Study of Civil War: Peace Research Institute Oslo*.

²³⁰ Uppsala Conflict Data Program: Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) Conflict Profile," *Center of the Study of Civil War: Peace Research Institute Oslo*.

²³¹ "Fragile States Index: Democratic Republic of Congo Country Dashboard," *Fund for Peace*.

For the purpose of this specific investigation and overall understanding of the factors that contribute to successful disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs, the Democratic Republic of Congo aligns well with the four hypotheses proposed in the first chapter of this study. Although the Sun City Peace Accords were signed in 2002, initiating the establishment of a DDR program in the state, the institutions required to carry out disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration required a year to develop.²³² This posed challenges to the program prior to its inauguration.²³³ CONADER, the national institution developed to oversee civilian disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, was not fully formed or present in each province of the DRC until December of 2003, almost two years after the signing of the initial peace agreement. In this case, had the program seen rapid implementation it is likely that it would have been more successful in its ability to transition former militants into civil society, as peace would have been fresh in the minds of armed organizations and the continuation of conflict would have been less visible throughout the nation. The Democratic Republic of Congo's DDR program also demonstrates the importance of the inclusion of all participants in the process. Members of the Mai-Mai, former Hutu genocidaires and Interahamwe from Rwanda living in the Congo, and the former Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, refused to participate in the demobilization process.²³⁴ As a result, conflict within the state continued from 2003 to 2008 and the safety of reintegrated Congolese could not be guaranteed by the government.

²³² "Democratic Republic of Congo: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Reform of the Army," *Amnesty International Report* (2007): 7.

²³³ "Democratic Republic of Congo: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Reform of the Army," *Amnesty International Report* (2007): 7.

²³⁴ Edmonds, Mills, and McNamee, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership."

The inability for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process to be inclusive of all conflicting groups in the state further contributed to the operation's inability to provide strong vocational training that incentivized former combatants from resurgence. Although fifty percent of those who participated in the DDR process within the Democratic Republic of Congo managed to increase their quality of life, the remaining fifty did not manage to see the same benefits.²³⁵ Many of the former combatants who received vocational training of employment support from the United Nations, the World Bank, or CONADER, did not receive a large enough income to support their needs or the needs of their family.²³⁶ Along with this, participants of the program were often unqualified for the jobs that they received, as the vocational training program demonstrated to lack strength and robustness.²³⁷ Overall, each dimension also did not receive adequate funding, and delays in the financing for each operation was often delayed, infrequent, and not flexible.²³⁸ Thus, the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in the Democratic Republic of Congo seemed to show signs of failure from the beginning. Although the successes that resulted from the operation should not go unnoticed, the program required stronger provisions and serious attention for it to serve as a viable solution to the discontinuation of violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Overall, the Democratic Republic of Congo serves as an example of a fragile state in which disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs failed to effectively end

²³⁵ "Demobilization and Reintegration in the Democratic Republic of Congo," *The World Bank*, March 11, 2013.

²³⁶ "Democratic Republic of Congo: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Reform of the Army," *Amnesty International Report* (2007): 17.

²³⁷ "Democratic Republic of Congo: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Reform of the Army," *Amnesty International Report* (2007): 17.

²³⁸ "Democratic Republic of Congo: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Reform of the Army," *Amnesty International Report* (2007): 7.

violence and result in stabilization. Both programs lacked the strong state oversight that countries like Burundi and Rwanda had the privilege of, resulting in disorganization within reintegration programs and lack of protection for transitioned militants who easily defaulted back into resurgence. Along with this, divisions within the Congolese military and lack of control regarding the reintegration of former militants into the armed forces resulted in alienation among different factions of combatants and ethnic groups, who often deserted or also defaulted into combat.²³⁹ Failure for the MDRP and MONUC to vet individual interested in joining the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo also resulted in human rights abusers gaining regional power and control through the military, further contributing to the increased violence in the state.²⁴⁰ For those who did not reintegration into the military, the United Nation's and World Bank's inability to secure the regions in which civilian Congolese lived and were reintegrated into resulted in violence and humanitarian crises like hunger and disease, resulting in a population of individuals who became more susceptible to violence and continued conflict.²⁴¹ Much of the failure of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in the Democratic Republic of Congo can also be attributed to the country's failure to include all warring parties in the peace agreement in 2002, which failed to fully curtail conflict as different rebel and militia factions continued their insurgency against the government, specifically in the Eastern Regions of the state.²⁴²

²³⁹ Richards, "Implementing DDR in Settings of Ongoing Conflict: The Organization of Fragmentation of Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo."

²⁴⁰ "DR Congo: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) and the Reform of the Army," *Amnesty International*, accessed March 29, 2020.

²⁴¹ Richards, "Implementing DDR in Settings of Ongoing Conflict: The Organization of Fragmentation of Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo."

²⁴² Edmonds, Mills, and McNamee, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership."

Failure for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs in the Democratic Republic of Congo to be holistic in their approach strongly influences the continuation of conflict in the state. Today, the Democratic Republic of Congo continued to be ranked the fifth most fragile state in the world with only Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan, and Syria ranked above it according to the *Fragile State Index*.²⁴³ Failure to cease violence in the region has resulted in low government legitimacy, a failing economy, and a humanitarian crisis. With the help of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs the government has managed to slowly increase its regional control, however, due to the fragility and instability within the nation reports of mass rapes, massacres, starvation, and disease continue into the present day.²⁴⁴ Failure for the country to adopt sustainable development projects as a result of its consistent history of violence further contribute to the state's inability to end violence through disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs, as former militants do not have a strong economic motivation to reinsert into civilian life. Overall, the failure for a strong and holistic disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program to be implemented in 2002 through MONUC and MDRP contributed to the continued instability within the country. Failure to include all members of the warring parties and a lack of a strong state government oversight, resulted in the overall inability for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs to succeed at curtailing violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the early 2000s.

²⁴³ "Fragile States Index: Democratic Republic of Congo Country Dashboard," *Fund for Peace*, accessed March 29, 2020.

²⁴⁴ "Questions and Answers: Democratic Republic of Congo Conflict," *BBC News*, accessed March 29, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-11108589>.

Chapter Five:

Comparative Analysis of DDR in Rwanda, Burundi, and

the Democratic Republic of Congo

According for the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program's report on Former Militants in Burundi, reintegrated soldiers commonly reported that they chose to participate in the war due to their anger and fear of insecurity, ideological principals, or their current state of poverty.²⁴⁵ Misery, poverty, and threats of insecurity largely went unchecked by the state, and many Burundians were recruited into militant groups and organizations like that FAB with the promise that their quality of life would only increase as a result. In one interview conducted by the World Bank's Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, a young unemployed man explained that his enlistment into the FAB was the result of his father's death and his mother's inability to find work. As a result, the family could no longer provide for each other, unable to pay for food and meet the financial requirement of school fees.²⁴⁶ The young man felt that he no longer had a choice to remain a bystander in the Civil War, as crippling poverty drove him to fight on the side of the FAB rather than any ideological arguments.²⁴⁷ Although the pressures of insecurity and poverty drove many individuals into a conflict they did not believe in, the promises that military service and militant action included was a strong enough incentive for them to stay. As Burundi struggled with conflict up until the late 1990s, many of the later demobilized former combatants felt that transitioning into civilian

²⁴⁵ Peter Uvin, "Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why They Joined, Why They Left, and How They Fared," *Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program Working Paper 3* (2007): 4

²⁴⁶ Uvin, "Ex-Combatants in Burundi," 4.

²⁴⁷ Uvin, "Ex-Combatants in Burundi," 5.

live was impossible.²⁴⁸ Thus, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs within the state needed to demonstrate that the transition was not only a possibility, but it would lead to a better future. Although Burundi demonstrated moderate success at deterring violence through the implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs, for the former militants who did receive the support of the government have noticed and increase to their quality of life. For example, on former combatants interviewed by the World Bank explained that with the financial support of the government and the education the individual received through his demobilization process, he managed to buy additional land and livestock, investing in long term benefits to assist his family's needs and provide economic security for himself.²⁴⁹ Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs, when successful, contribute to the stabilization of a nation, the reduction of violence and human suffering, and can positively contribute to economic development and the betterment of the standard of living in communities throughout the region.

In Eastern Africa, violence in the states of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo were not only heinous, but occurred in some of the most vulnerable communities in the world. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, many individuals face the hardships of malnutrition, exposure to disease, and extreme destitution in addition to threats of insecurity, violence, insufficient access to resources, and vulnerability to crime and militant activity. In Burundi, communities face high levels of population density and poverty, as the World Bank estimates that in 2019 roughly 1.77 million people living in the state required

²⁴⁸ Uvin, "Ex-Combatants in Burundi," 10.

²⁴⁹ Uvin, "Ex-Combatants in Burundi," 14.

humanitarian assistance.²⁵⁰ Exposure to political violence and repression also plagues the state, which is in part the result of the weak enforcement of peacebuilding agreements, like the Arusha Accords. Of the three case studies, Rwanda has fared the best, as the development of strong institutions and social safety nets have contributed to the state's consistent increase in economic growth over the last two decades.²⁵¹ For the region, Rwanda has become a demonstration of economic and social stability in the wake of one of the worst tragedies of mankind; yet, internationally the state is still considered a member of the developing world with an average per capita income of 1,343 United States Dollars and a poverty rate of 39.1%, with 16.3% of the country's population living on less than two dollars a day.²⁵² The establishment of strong and withstanding disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs in these three states proved to be vital to the attempts to end human suffering and strengthen civil society so that communities have a chance at a prosperous future. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs have changed the lives of hundreds of thousands of individuals in Eastern and Central Africa, and although all of the operations in this region have not seen promising measures of success, those that have benefitted from the process experience stability and support from their government, and provide peace of mind to members of civil society searching for security amongst an environment of brutal chaos.

²⁵⁰ "The World Bank in Burundi: Overview," The World Bank, accessed April 16, 2020. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/burundi/overview>.

²⁵¹ "The World Bank in Rwanda: Overview," The World Bank, accessed April 17, 2020, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/rwanda/overview>.

²⁵² "About Rwanda," United Nations Development Program, accessed April 16, 2020, <https://www.rw.undp.org/content/rwanda/en/home/countryinfo.html>.

In Rwanda, the demobilization and reintegration operations conducted to transition former combatants into civil society resulted in a complete halt on violence in the state by 2006.²⁵³ The success of peacebuilding efforts to reduce the presence of conflict within the state allowed for former militants to successfully reintegrated into the economy and provided long term incentives for participants of the program to choose the long-term path of peace. As “Chapter Two – Rwanda: Light in the Mists of Darkness” suggests, the framework of their state-operated demobilization and reintegration program serves as a successful case study to evaluate when seeking to understand the factors that contribute to a strong approach to DDR in Eastern and Central Africa. Rwanda is regarded as being successful due to the states ability to provide participants with a robust reeducation program, known as *ingando*, and intensive vocational curriculums with the temporary financial support for reintegrated individuals on behalf of the Rwandan Government, the United Nations and the World Bank.²⁵⁴ The success of demobilization and reintegration within the state can also be attributed to the adequate amount of funding that Rwanda received for its peacebuilding projects. During the Rwandan Civil War and the subsequent Genocide, the international community largely failed to assist the state in any efforts to halt the continuation of the massacres and mass amounts of human suffering. The greatest loss of life in the shortest amount of time in human history, the murder of over eight hundred thousand Rwandans in the genocide left organizations like the United Nations with a feeling of perpetual guilt for their inaction and ignorance. Thus, peacebuilding efforts through mechanisms like demobilization and reintegration within Rwanda experienced a steady flow of

²⁵³ Uppsala Conflict Data Program: Rwanda Profile,” *Center of the Study of Civil War: Peace Research Institute Oslo* accessed April 15, 2020, <https://ucdp.uu.se/country/517>.

²⁵⁴ Martin Edmonds, Greg Mills, and Terance McNamee, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes: The Experience of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo,” *African Security* 2:1 (2009).

funding that was flexible for the project's needs, as the state government under the new leadership of the Rwandan Patriotic Force had a hand in the implementation and operation of these institutions. Of the case studies explored in this qualitative analysis, Rwanda serves as a demonstration of the success of demobilization and reintegration, despite the inevitable challenges the program faced in the uncertain environment created in state's after experiencing conflict.

One case study that serves as a moderately successful, yet still flawed example of a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program in Central and Eastern Africa occurred in Burundi. As mentioned in "Chapter Three – Good, but Not Good Enough: DDR in Burundi," disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs in Burundi only managed to reintegrate one-third of the target population of fifty-five thousand individuals. Although the program provided strong reintegration packages for participants and offered five strong vocational pathways to transition back into the formal economy, funding for the program proved to be unstable and infrequent. The stoppage of funding on the international level resulted in the inability for the DDR institutions to consistently operate, so despite the high quality reeducation and reintegration programs in the Burundi operations, the lack of consistency and inadequate funding resulted in a small carrying capacity for former combatants. Burundi serves as a strong demonstration for the consequences of inadequate funding and the challenges of international bureaucracy, as these problems have largely contributed to the lack of attention for the two-thirds of the target population that never demobilized. Violence did subside in Burundi between the beginning of the implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration operations and the conclusion of the program in 2007. Despite this, violence from the state and non-state actors against the civilian population was still present, regardless of its decrease. The resurgence

of violence in the state and growing political instability beginning with democratic erosion in 2015 also demonstrates the weaknesses in the peacebuilding process within the state, as the failure of the Arusha Accords to serve as a constitutional safeguard on democracy in the state can largely be attributed to the lack of enforcement and criticism on the Burundian government from the international community. Thus, as political instability increases in Burundi in the present day, so does criticism on the country's peacebuilding projects that failed to prevent the eruption of any type of conflict in the future.

Despite the shortcomings of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in Burundi, within Central and Eastern Africa the Democratic Republic of Congo serves as the strongest example of a failed disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program. In this comparative analysis, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration initiatives in the Democratic Republic of Congo experienced an increasing number of flaws when equated to the peacebuilding programs operating in Burundi and Rwanda. Although the instability and conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo was unique in comparison to Rwanda and Burundi, as chronologically it began later and continued on despite the piloting of peacebuilding projects, some of the program's failure can be attributed to the design of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. Although the implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration within the Democratic Republic of Congo was heavily assisted by the United Nations and the World Bank, the program received infrequent and inadequate funding, similar to that of Burundi. However, the programs initiated in the Democratic Republic of Congo did not provide strong reintegration packages of vocational training, as many of the former combatants who transitioned through the operations reported that they did not receive suitable financial support from the government to assist in their reintegration and felt that they were unqualified

for the jobs they were assigned. Former combatants experienced difficulty through their transition into civil society and felt unsupported economically, resulting in strong incentives to default back into militant activities. The state failed to provide security for those who were reintegrated as well, further contributing to the probable possibility for resurgence of violence throughout the state. Despite these problems, the program was doomed from the beginning. Within the Democratic Republic of Congo, every participating party within the state was not included in the development of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration plans, and therefore many combatants demonstrated disinterest and resistance to the process from the very beginning. During the period in which disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration was initially implemented in the state, fluctuations to the rate of state-based, non-state, and one-sided violence in the state resulted in further instability. The Democratic Republic of Congo serves as an example of the consequences of weak disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs through the continued violence experienced throughout the country and the corresponding *Fragile State Index* ranking as the fifth most instable state in the world.

This comparative analysis investigated the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs for former militants in three Eastern and Central African countries. These three states were chosen as the case studies for this investigation due to their shared similarities in the nature of their conflicts, their mutual inclusion in the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program in the Great Lakes Region, and their influence on study of peacebuilding and post-conflict development mechanisms within the wider community of Conflict Management Studies and Global Governance. The Republic of Rwanda, the Republic of Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo serve as strong subjects for the understanding of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs due to their varying levels of

success, despite receiving similar attention from partners within the international community like the United Nations, the World Bank's International Development Association, and the African Union. Today, the effects of the peacebuilding projects in these three nations have created very different results, as the presence of conflict at the end of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in each state varies between the three and their present stability is also quite different among the case studies. From this investigation, it has been determined that disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants effectively halted conflict in the Republic of Rwanda, was only moderately effective at reducing violence in the Republic of Burundi, and failed in the Democratic Republic of Congo in its efforts to curb violence and incentivize militants to remain reintegrated into civil society and removed from militia activity. Although measurements on the success of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs on the reduction of violence within these three Eastern and Central African states was important to the outcome of this investigation, this project sought to further understand the factors within the framework of these DDR programs that contributed to their success or failure. To further understand the characteristics that showed to have a large contribution on the ability for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs to reduce or halt the presence of violence, the comparative analysis examined four specific hypotheses.

A. Results

This comparative analysis aimed to analyze four specific hypotheses regarding the factors that contribute to the ability for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs to reduce or deter conflict within each state. For reference, those hypotheses are stated below...

1. Disarmament programs are more likely to be successful in their contribution to deterring conflict if they are implemented within a year after the peace agreement.

Disarmament programs are also more likely to be successful if more than a majority of arms in the nation are collected and the majority of combatants are disarmed.

2. Demobilization programs are more likely to be successful in their contribution to deterring conflict if all parties privy to the conflict are bound to the peace accords and uphold their responsibilities throughout the mandate.
3. Reintegration programs are more likely to be successful to their contributions to deterring conflict if the vocational training is of high quality. Along with this, reintegration programs are more likely to be successful if a majority of disarmed and demobilized combatants are enrolled and graduate from this vocational training.
4. The overall success of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs is likely if each dimension is adequately funded.²⁵⁵

Overall, I argued that these sub-hypotheses are the result of a holistic approach to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs in which each dimension is equally emphasized for its cruciality to the overall success of the program. However, through the examination of each case study and the programs they implemented, I can conclude that the success of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration is not necessarily equated to equal implementation of each dimension. Along with this, a holistic approach to DDR did not demonstrate to be imperative to the success of the programs at deterring or reducing conflict, as Rwanda's operation lacked any

²⁵⁵ See page 19 of "Chapter One: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in Eastern and Central Africa."

form of disarmament. Aside from this conclusion, of the four sub-hypotheses proposed at the start of the investigation only three withstand the results of the analysis.

Through a comparative analysis of the disarmament programs in Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, it can be concluded that the time period between the signing of the peace accord and the implementation of disarmament did not demonstrate to show significant effects on the ability of DDR to reduce violence within the state. Along with this, although the collection of weapons is often crucial for the success of disarmament within post-conflict environments, each of the three states analyzed in this study demonstrated varying results on the success of disarmament, regardless of the presence of violence. In Rwanda, where DDR was largely a success due to its ability to halt violence within the state, a formal disarmament program was never implemented. As stated in “Chapter Two,” disarmament in Rwanda was never employed as a peacebuilding mechanism due to the continuing existence of ethnic tension among the Hutus and Tutsis after the end of the genocide.²⁵⁶ The Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, along with the assistance of the United Nations and World Bank, did not require former combatants to disarm prior to demobilizing. This was attributed to the distrust of the Hutu population toward the Rwandan Patriotic Force run government, where the consensus among DDR participating Hutus was that if they disarmed they would become at risk to a retaliation from the Tutsis on behalf of the government, similarly to the events that transpired in Burundi.²⁵⁷ Thus, the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission did not require the collection of weapons prior to former combatants entrance into

²⁵⁶ Nelson Alusala, “Disarmament and Reconciliation: Rwanda’s Concern,” *Institute for Security Studies* 108 (2005).

²⁵⁷ Alusala, “Disarmament and Reconciliation: Rwanda’s Concern.”

demobilization programs. In Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo, provisions regarding disarmament were different than their predecessor. The government of Burundi successfully collected over 5,600 weapons from former combatants in the state under the supervision of the United Nations Operations in Burundi, who then became responsible for the destruction and disposal of these arms.²⁵⁸ Despite efforts to disarm combatants in Burundi, the time period between the signage of the Arusha Accords and the implementation of disarmament did not demonstrate a significant influence on the success of reducing violence in the state. Similarly, disarmament efforts in the Democratic Republic of Congo resulted in the collection of 118,459 weapons throughout the state, however, the presence of violence and the probability of disarmed combatants defaulting back into conflict remained high throughout the country.²⁵⁹ Along with this, the establishment of CONADER in the state was not until December of 2003, coming two years after the signing of the South Africa Sun City Peace Accords.²⁶⁰ The time in which disarmament is implemented and the program's ability to collect weapons from former combatants is important for the success of DDR, however, this comparative analysis highlights that it does not serve as a crucial component of successful reducing violence throughout each state.

Although the first hypothesis for this investigation, relating to disarmament, did not demonstrate to significantly influence the success of DDR programs at reducing or halting

²⁵⁸ Henri Boshoff and Waldemar Vrey, "A Technical Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: A Case Study from Burundi," *Institute for Security Studies Monograph Series* 125 (2006): 20.

²⁵⁹ "Demobilization and Reintegration in the Democratic Republic of Congo," Report from *The World Bank*, March 11, 2013, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2013/03/11/demobilization-and-reintegration-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo>.

²⁶⁰ "United Nations Organization Stabilization Missions in the DR Congo: DDR," *The United Nations*, accessed March 29, 2020, <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/ddr>.

conflict, the other three hypotheses presented in the introduction to this comparative analysis did significantly influence the effectiveness of each operation. In Rwanda and Burundi, the inclusion of the warring parties presents in the conflict within the peace agreement significantly influenced the willingness of former combatants to participate in demobilization or reinsertion programs. In Burundi, nineteen parties participated in the 2000 Arusha Accords, with the only exception being the FNL, who's continued their militant campaign throughout the state until their own peace agreement was signed with the Burundian national government in 2006.²⁶¹ The exclusion of the FNL in the 2000 Arusha Agreement accounts for the continuation of minor acts of guerrilla violence in the state after 2003. The shortcomings of DDR in Burundi are not equated to the necessary exclusion of the FNL from the peace accords, but rather, the inadequate and inconsistency of funding that will be further discussed in the remainder of this conclusion. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, exclusion of warring parties in the peace agreement and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process demonstrated outstanding challenges for the success of the program at curtailing violence. The exclusion of the Mai-Mai, former Rwandan Hutu genocidaires, the Interahamwe, and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda from the agreement to implement disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration resulted in CONADER's inability to transition former combatants into civil society without threats of resurgence. Many of these individuals, if willing to demobilize, would participate in an effort to seek the reintegration benefits from the state and international organizations and then would divert back to conflict. Along with this, the continuation of violence in the state, as a result of the failure to establish ceasefire, resulted in the program's insecurity. The importance of

²⁶¹ Edmonds, Mills, and McNamee, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes."

the inclusion of participants within the conflict in the implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs is further supported by this comparative analysis, as Rwanda and Burundi experienced success and the Democratic Republic of Congo failed to maintain peace in the region.

The success of reintegration programs and the strength of the benefits that they provide are vital to incentivizing former militants from defaulting into militant behavior or the continuation of conflict in the future. Of the three stages of DDR programs, this comparative analysis highlights the importance of a strong reintegration curriculum and program support. In Rwanda, robust reeducation programs are partly attributed to the success of the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission at curtailing violence in the state. In Rwanda, *ingando* contributed to the reduction of ethnic tension among the Hutu and Tutsi populations, and assisted in the redevelopment of a national Rwandan identity that was well removed from the former manipulations of Belgian colonialism.²⁶² Alongside the *ingando* education, the Rwandan government provided job placements for individuals who continued through the reintegration process in the redevelopment of formerly destroyed infrastructure, offering an employment incentive as a means to stabilize the nation and prevent the eruption of further conflict. In Burundi, robust reintegration packages resulted in the state's assistance to the financial support of 19,739 former militants. Although this was roughly only one-third of the program's target population, reintegration in Burundi provided comprehensive vocational training and five avenues of employment for former combatants that participated in the process. The government of Burundi also aided with the families and dependents of former militants in

²⁶² Edmonds, Mills, and McNamee, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes."

the state, demonstrating the program's commitment to robust resettlement packages. Despite the state's inability to reintegrate two-thirds of their target population, those that did participate in demobilization received benefits and strong support from the National Commission of Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration. Of the three case studies, the Democratic Republic of Congo highlights the importance of robust vocational training curriculums and government support through reintegration. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the government failed to provide employment opportunities for participants in the process and benefits packages that could support former militants and provide a steady income through their transition. The lack of resources and development of reintegration in the Democratic Republic of Congo created a weak safety net for individuals participating in the process, and did not serve as a competitive incentive for the deterrence of violence in comparison to the benefits and income that militant groups were providing. Had reintegration in the Democratic Republic of Congo been well supported and developed, the incentives for former militants to resurge into conflict would have been minimal in comparison to the choice of peace.

Despite the successes or shortcomings of each dimension of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in Central and Eastern Africa, the amount of funding each program received did influence the strength of each operation at deterring violence in the state. However, funding demonstrated to only dramatically influence the success of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs if it is overwhelmingly controlled by the state and thus is flexible. In Rwanda, the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission was not only well funded by the remaining resources of the national government, but the program also received strong support from the international community who previously neglected the state despite their tragedy. In Rwanda, demobilization and reintegration efforts effectively reduced


violence in part because they were well funded and were able to support the financial burden of former militants; the state even benefited from their participation as former combatants entered the work force through infrastructure development projects. Burundi did not experience the same success Rwanda did regarding financial support. One of the largest reasons Burundi only successfully transitioned one third of their target population was due to the state's inability to support the other two thirds in the process. Inconsistent funding resulted in the stoppage of demobilization facilities and disarmament programs, causing uncertainty in the program's ability to carry the targeted fifty-five thousand individuals. Lack of funding came on behalf of the international community, as fluctuation in the willingness for members states to support peacebuilding efforts in the Republic of Burundi was never fully guaranteed due to the limitations of global governance and the weak enforcement of international agreements. However, although Burundi's DDR program received inadequate funding from the international community, the state's control over the finances of the program allowed for flexibility in the money's use. In comparison, low levels of the state's control of funding in the Democratic Republic of Congo created instability within the program, creating insufficient funding and inflexible cash flow. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, however, the extraneous factors such as the weakness of the national government also influenced the inability for the program to be adequately funded. In the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo, low funding for reintegration benefits resulted in very little incentives for former militants to remain peaceful in the presence of financial opportunities in militant action. Thus, funding demonstrates to be crucial to the success of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs; however, this is too simple.

It is obvious that adequate funding for any peacebuilding or post-conflict development project would be critical to the success of the operation. Although this comparative analysis demonstrates this in action, it also highlights that one key to the success of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program funding in the strength of the state's control over the operation. In Rwanda, the state's control over the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission resulted in a reduction of bureaucracy and decreased reliance on the instability of international aid. The Burundi National Commission of Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration also was a state run enterprise that controlled the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process – however, the state relied heavily on international funding that was not consistently available for the nation in comparison to Rwanda. In reality, the willingness for the international community to provide Rwanda consistent funding and their unwillingness to match the same in Burundi accounts for some of the variations among both programs' success. In comparison to Burundi and Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo represents the importance of the creation of a transitional government and the subsequent state control that follows it. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the state government lacked strong control over the operation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; the state also lacked the resources to fund the program, resulting in the reliance on the international community partners like the World Bank and United Nations who demonstrated inconsistency and thinly spread resources. Although this study attempts to simplify the factors that contribute to the success of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, the complexities of each program demonstrate that other influences might be at play. In further research, I plan to understand the relationship between the establishment of transitional governments and disarmament, demobilization, and

reintegration programs to investigate the possible solutions to the challenges that weak governance poses on peacebuilding operations.

B. Discussion

Overall, this comparative analysis demonstrated that of the four hypotheses proposed in the introduction of this investigation, the inclusion of all participating parties in the peace agreement, the robustness of reintegration programs and vocational trainings, and adequate funding are more important to the success of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs than the time in which they take to be implemented. None of the three programs were implemented within a year of the peace agreement, which highlights the lack of importance of this prediction in comparison to the other three. The results of the three programs is listed below, to aid in the ability to understanding the successes and shortcomings of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in each state.



In Rwanda, the percentage of former militants that were successfully reintegrated through the DDR process was 128%, demonstrating the that program managed to carry an extra 12,538 individuals that were not initially anticipated to participate. In Burundi, 36% of the anticipated

former militant population participated in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in the state, leaving 64%, or 35,261 individuals from the target population unattended to. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the number of former combatants that were processed is much higher than in Burundi and Rwanda, however, only 58% of the target population in the Democratic Republic of Congo was actually reintegrated. This percentage, although higher than Burundi's, does not account for the number of individuals who defaulted into violence after participating in reintegration and the high levels of violence within the state that ceased to decrease despite disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts.

The various levels of success in the crusade to deter or halt conflict in each of these nations through disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, could have also been influenced by other factors. Although this comparative analysis investigates the variations between disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration policy, the variables influencing these programs success are difficult, if not impossible, to completely isolate. Extraneous factors like the nature of each conflict, the size of each state, the strength of national governments, and the state of economic development each nation experiences can influence the effectiveness of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration at curtailing violence. In Rwanda, rapid economic growth created a robust economy for citizens to enter – assisting in the east of reintegration's implementation in the state. Initially considered a Low Income Country (LIC), Rwanda is currently categorized as a Middle-Income Country (MIC) after the implementation of two "Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategies." In comparison, failure in the Democratic Republic of Congo is reflective of other factors within the state that create vulnerability to violence. The sheer size of the Democratic Republic of Congo, in comparison to Rwanda and Burundi, poses challenges to the consolidation of power for the national

government. Along with this, the weakness of the national government required disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in the state to be externally overseen by organizations like the United Nations and the World Bank who lack local knowledge of community needs.²⁶³

International organizations, like the United Nations and World Bank, are necessary to the implementation of these programs, however just receiving their support is insufficient. Instead, strong collaboration between the state and international institutions is required for successful implementation. In Rwanda, strong government control by one party, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, influenced the ability for the state to have strong control over the former combatants in the state. The conflict's clear winner, the RPF, thus instituted peacebuilding with full control. In Burundi, the opposite is true. Perhaps one of the reasons that their program was only moderately successful despite their ability to curb violence is due to patients in the creation of a transitional government and the establishment of an ethnically balanced military. Alongside these factors, the Democratic Republic of Congo is one of the largest states in Africa, in comparison to the smaller nations of Burundi and Rwanda, who have dramatically smaller populations and more cultural homogeneity.

In these three states, it is also important to understand that all three conflicts are interconnected, and therefore, cannot be studied in isolation. The success of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in Rwanda served as an example for the operations in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Although Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo did not demonstrate the same successes that Rwanda did, the design and implementation of their programs were largely modeled after the institutions in state's operation. Along with this,

²⁶³ Andrew Kolln, "DDR in the DRC: The Limitations of Externally Led Approaches," Peace Insight, accessed April 17, 2020, <https://www.peaceinsight.org/blog/2011/12/ddr-drc/>.

the conflicts within each state were interconnected, as the mass exodus of Hutu genocidaires, Interahamwe, and the Hutu militants fled Rwanda and Burundi, and resettled in the Democratic Republic of Congo where they fuel much of the conflict. Outbreaks of violence in Burundi in the early 2000s were often the result of former Burundian and Rwandan Hutu genocidaires living in the Eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo retaliating against the young government. The legacies of ethnic violence within these three states has strongly influenced the outbreak of violence and the ability for each nation to reach peace, resulting in the inability for these three cases of conflict to be studies in isolation from one another.

This comparative analysis demonstrates the success of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs at decreasing the presence of violence in Eastern and Central Africa. The success of programs like these are vital around the world, as they improve security throughout the globe and increase the quality of life among some of the most destitute and vulnerable populations of all. This study highlights the need for change in the framework of peacebuilding projects in states such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, which still remains the fifth most fragile state across the globe, only to follow Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan, and Syria. Failure of these programs influenced the lives of millions of individuals worldwide, like Divine, a seventy-two-year-old woman living in fear of rape, extreme poverty, and the uncertain future of her family.²⁶⁴ The importance of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration surpasses the lives of participants in armed conflict, but stretches to the safety, security, and stability of communities across that world that have experienced tragedies that are incomprehensible for individuals who have never had to witness them. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration

²⁶⁴ “DRC: Women and Girls Bodies are not Battlegrounds,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, accessed December 16, 2019.

operations in post-conflict environments can serve as a beacon of hope for individuals suffering from the presence of violence, only if they are effectively implemented.

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